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 APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE 
EXPLANATIONS: LEARNING FROM THE 
WISCONSIN AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCES 
MICHAEL M. O‘HEAR* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
American courts traditionally have not supplied any meaningful appellate 
review of sentences.
1
  Indeed, prior to the 1980s, the great majority of states 
did not give their appellate courts the authority to review the propriety of 
particular sentences; as long as the sentence was within (often very wide) 
statutory parameters and certain minimal constitutional requirements were 
satisfied, the trial court‘s sentencing decision was effectively beyond 
challenge, and the courts of appeals had no role to play.
2
  Even in the few 
states authorizing a more active role for the appellate bench, sentencing 
decisions were only very rarely subject to thoughtful review.
3
 
Although some prominent voices began to call for reform in the 1950s and 
1960s,
4
 proposals for more meaningful appellate review did not gain much 
traction until the 1970s and 1980s, when they were often linked to a broader 
effort to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing.
5
  This broader effort 
resulted in the implementation of binding sentencing guidelines in at least six 
states and the federal system.
6
 
Appellate review obviously plays a critical role in a mandatory guidelines 
system: it is the appellate courts, after all, that ensure compliance with the 
guidelines by lower courts.  What is much less clear is how appellate courts 
might contribute to the sentencing process in jurisdictions that do not have 
mandatory guidelines.  The question has become even more pressing since the 
United States Supreme Court‘s 2004 decision in Blakely v. Washington, 
 
* Associate Dean for Research and Professor, Marquette University Law School.  Editor, 
Federal Sentencing Reporter.  B.A., J.D. Yale University.  I am grateful for comments from 
participants in the Marquette Law School Criminal Appeals Conference and a Marquette Works-in-
Progress Workshop, and for research assistance from Brian Borkowicz.  
1. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of 
Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1997). 
2. Id. at 1443–44. 
3. Id. at 1444. 
4. Id. at 1446. 
5. Id. at 1447. 
6. Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era, 17 FED. 
SENT‘G REP. 233, 239 n.3 (2005). 
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wherein the Court held that defendants have a jury-trial right with respect to 
fact-finding that increases their maximum punishment in a mandatory 
sentencing regime.
7
  Such new procedural rights will surely discourage the 
adoption of mandatory sentencing guidelines in additional states.  Indeed, the 
Sixth Amendment principle articulated in Blakely has already caused the 
federal system to shift from mandatory to nonbinding ―advisory‖ guidelines.8 
In this Article, I focus on one particular function that appellate courts 
might usefully perform in the modified federal system and in other 
jurisdictions lacking mandatory guidelines: that is, reviewing the adequacy of 
the explanations given by trial court judges to justify their sentencing 
decisions.  A de minimis form of explanation review would ensure only that 
some explanation was offered on the record for the sentence imposed.  I have 
in mind, though, a more rigorous form of review, in which appellate courts 
would insist on the identification of the considerations that played the most 
important role in the selection of the sentence, a discussion of how those 
considerations influenced the sentencing decision, and specific responses to 
any arguments made by the defendant for a more lenient sentence. 
Such ―explanation review‖ is conceptually distinct from substantive 
review of the sentence: the former asks whether the sentence has been 
adequately justified, while the latter asks whether the sentence could be 
adequately justified.  To be sure, at the margins, explanation review can shade 
into substantive review, for an explanation cannot truly count as an 
explanation if some minimal standards of substantive rationality are not 
satisfied.  It will not do for a judge to explain her sentence by saying, ―I am 
sending you to prison for ten years because the Moon rose in Libra last night.‖  
Still, if rationality requirements are kept modest, explanation review can 
retain a methodologically distinct character from the sort of substantive 
review exemplified, for instance, by Eighth Amendment proportionality 
review.
9
  Explanation review should thus be conceptualized as a species of 
procedural review
10—bearing in mind that the substance/procedure distinction 
may have constitutional implications in this context, as substantive review of 
sentences is in tension with the Blakely principle.
11
 
 
7. 542 U.S. 296, 308, 313–14 (2004). 
8. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005). 
9. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
10. Nor is it the only conceivable form of procedural review.  For instance, an appellate court 
might also consider whether the defendant was given adequate notice of and opportunity to be heard 
regarding the considerations that most affected the determination of his sentence. 
11. Justice Scalia developed the constitutional analysis in his concurrence in Rita v. United 
States: 
Under such a system [in which trial courts, as a result of substantive review, 
lack full discretion to sentence within the statutory range], for every given crime 
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As a matter of formal doctrine, explanation review is already an accepted 
feature of the sentencing law in several jurisdictions.
12
  But courts have 
struggled to give the explanation requirement coherent content, and few 
sentences are actually overturned on the basis of inadequate explanation.
13
  As 
I have suggested elsewhere, the difficulties may stem, in part, from the courts‘ 
failure to appreciate what may be achieved through rigorous explanation 
review.
14
 
Against this backdrop, my purposes in this Article are threefold.  First, in 
Part II, I make the case for robust explanation review, identifying several 
useful purposes that are plausibly served by a systematically enforced 
explanation requirement.  Second, in Parts III and IV, I describe and critique 
the explanation review jurisprudence in two specific jurisdictions.  Although 
both jurisdictions, Wisconsin and the federal system, employ advisory 
sentencing guidelines, they illustrate two different extremes in the way that 
advisory guidelines may be handled in connection with explanation review.  I 
will argue, in fact, that both approaches are flawed.  Finally, in Part V, 
drawing on the best parts of the Wisconsin and federal case law, I propose a 
set of principles that may be used to give explanation review more precise and 
rigorous content. 
II.  THE CASE FOR EXPLANATION REVIEW 
The functions potentially performed by explanation review fall into three 
categories: procedural justice, substantive justice, and transparency and 
information-sharing.  Each category is examined separately below. 
A.  Procedural Justice 
In the present context, procedural justice means treating the defendant 
 
there is some maximum sentence that will be upheld as reasonable based only 
on the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.  Every sentence 
higher than that is legally authorized only by some judge-found fact, in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. 
551 U.S. 338, 372 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Although 
the Rita majority rejected Justice Scalia‘s analysis in the context of a facial challenge, the Court did 
not preclude the possibility of as-applied challenges to the system of substantive review of sentences.  
Id. at 375. 
12. See, e.g., Rita, 551 U.S. at 356; State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 28, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 
N.W.2d 197; Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007); State v. O‘Donnell, 564 A.2d 
1202, 1205 (N.J. 1989). 
13. See, e.g., an ―informational‖ provision appended to but not submitted for approval as part 
of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.ZZ cmt. k at 338 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) 
[hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING] (―No state sentencing system with advisory 
guidelines has yet produced effective appellate-court scrutiny of trial-court penalties.‖). 
14. Michael M. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 460–61 (2009) 
[hereinafter O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences]. 
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with respect throughout the process by which the sentence is determined and 
imposed, regardless of the severity of the punishment ultimately selected.
15
  
To some, it may seem perverse for a judge to go out of her way to provide 
respectful treatment to a person who has been found guilty of a crime and who 
is soon to suffer the just consequences.  Yet, a considerable body of social 
psychological research suggests that respectful treatment during a legal 
decision-making process promotes (a) acceptance of the outcome of that 
process, regardless of the outcome‘s favorability; (b) perceptions that the legal 
authorities have legitimacy; and (c) a sense of obligation to obey the law in 
the future.
16
  Thus, among other benefits, procedural justice in sentencing can 
advance the rehabilitation and crime-prevention ends of criminal law.
17
  
Moreover, respectful treatment helps to remind everyone involved that it is 
the defendant‘s conduct, not the defendant‘s person, that warrants 
condemnation; the defendant always retains his essential human dignity, 
which his fellow human beings are obliged to respect.
18
  There is, in other 
words, an important ethical dimension to procedural justice.
19
 
The social psychology research has identified several characteristics that 
can help to make a decision-making process ―just‖ in the procedural sense.20  
Two, in particular, merit discussion.  First, a decision maker enhances 
perceptions of procedural justice by displaying neutrality, that is, by providing 
reassurance that she ―is unbiased, honest, and principled.‖21  Second, a 
decision maker also enhances perceptions of procedural justice by exhibiting 
consideration, that is, by demonstrating that attention was actually paid to the 
arguments made by participants in the process, even if they were not 
ultimately found persuasive.
22
 
Explanation review can thus advance the cause of procedural justice if it 
helps to ensure that sentencing judges provide reassurances of neutrality and 
consideration.  To be sure, all sentencing judges likely perceive themselves to 
 
15. See id. at 476.  
16. Michael M. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 420–22 
(2008) [hereinafter O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining]. 
17. See id. at 432–36 (discussing benefits of procedural justice to criminal justice system).  The 
American Law Institute articulates a similar intuition in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. o at 22 (―Even if a system of laws is built on morally 
sound precepts, and is well designed to further utilitarian goals, it fails if it cannot command the 
respect of those it governs.‖). 
18. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 476–77. 
19. To the extent that victims participate in sentencing, they, too, ought to be treated in a 
procedurally just fashion for essentially the same reasons.  See Michael M. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining 
and Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 326–31 (2007). 
20. Id. at 326–27. 
21. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining, supra note 16, at 428. 
22. Id. at 429. 
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be neutral and duly considerate of litigants‘ arguments.  But, especially in the 
press of business in high-volume urban courtrooms, it is easy to imagine 
judges not giving much self-conscious attention to reassuring others of their 
neutrality and consideration.  Yet, given the gulf of class, age, race, education, 
and other characteristics that typically separate defendants from judges, many 
defendants will surely approach sentencing with considerable skepticism that 
the court system is truly neutral and will pay attention to what they have to 
say.  In this setting, appellate courts can play a helpful role by reminding 
sentencing judges to make explicit the aspects of their reasoning that enhance 
perceptions of respectful treatment. 
With respect to neutrality, some of the particular concerns include 
perceptions that sentences may sometimes reflect racial or other improper 
forms of bias, personal vindictiveness, political grandstanding, or 
unconsidered emotional reactions to the crime.  Judges may diminish these 
concerns by explaining their sentences by reference to general principles and 
by showing how those general principles justify the particular punishment 
imposed.  Similarly, judges may enhance perceptions of neutrality by showing 
that their sentences are based on objective benchmarks. 
Likewise, perceptions of consideration may be undermined by the sense 
that the judge has made up her mind before the defendant or the defendant‘s 
lawyer has had an opportunity to speak, or that the judge reflexively dismisses 
whatever is said by or on behalf of a defendant.  Such concerns are likely 
allayed to the extent that the judge specifically responds to the major points 
made in the defendant‘s favor by explaining how each point influenced the 
sentence imposed or providing a reason why the point was not treated as a 
significant one. 
In Part V, I will propose somewhat more detailed standards for 
explanation review that are intended to enhance perceptions of neutrality and 
consideration, but this should be sufficient for now to give a sense of how 
explanation review might contribute to procedural justice. 
B.  Substantive Justice 
In sentencing, substantive justice has two dimensions.  The first measures 
how well the sentence accomplishes the recognized purposes of sentencing.  
The basic federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), nicely captures the 
objective: ―The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to achieve the purposes‖ of just punishment (retribution), 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
23
  This dimension, which I refer 
 
23. A similar ideal is embraced in the American Bar Association‘s (ABA) STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 18-6.1(a), at 219 (3d ed. 1994), and in the tentative draft of the American Law 
Institute‘s (ALI) MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(a)(iii), at 1. 
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to as ―purpose-advancement‖ or ―purposefulness,‖ might be sufficient by 
itself, but for the fact that the purposes of sentencing are largely 
indeterminate.  In any given case, different purposes might point in quite 
different directions.
24
  And, even if the purposes were more consistent with 
one another or a system were devised for prioritizing purposes when they 
come into conflict,
25
 the science and philosophy of punishment are not 
sufficiently advanced to translate a given set of offense and offender 
characteristics into a precise sentencing outcome.
26
  I do not mean to say that 
purpose-advancement is a hopeless measure of justice; a due regard for 
purposes is apt to rule out the extremes of severity or lenience in many cases.  
 
24. For instance, while retribution theory tends to downplay the importance of criminal history 
and other offender characteristics, these factors will tend to play a much more important role in 
implementing incapacitative or rehabilitative purposes.  This difference might matter a great deal to 
proportionality review in a range of different types of cases, such as those involving a defendant with 
a serious criminal history who commits a minor crime.  This scenario, of course, was famously 
presented to the Supreme Court in Ewing v. California, in which a multiple-repeat offender received 
what was effectively a life sentence for shoplifting three golf clubs.  538 U.S. 11, 38–39 (2003) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).  As Justice Scalia suggested in a concurring opinion, the sentence seems hard 
to defend from the standpoint of retributive justice.  Id. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Yet, the 
Court nonetheless affirmed the sentence in the face of an Eighth Amendment proportionality 
challenge, with the plurality finding the sentence justifiable on grounds of incapacitation and 
deterrence.  Id. at 32. 
25. To be sure, a jurisdiction implementing proportionality review might do as the ALI has 
done and emphasize retribution as the single most important purpose of sentencing.  MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 7.ZZ cmt. g at 329–31.  It is far from clear, though, that 
sufficient social consensus exists regarding retribution for a jurisdiction to implement and maintain 
such a one-dimensional form of proportionality review.  See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 23, § 18-2.1 cmt. at 10 (―The Standards‘ drafters recognized that there is no 
national consensus regarding the operative purposes of criminal sentencing.‖).  Minnesota‘s 
experience with mandatory sentencing guidelines provides an interesting case study.  Although the 
state‘s guidelines were designed to achieve retributive purposes, the appellate cases implementing the 
guidelines system quickly recognized a variety of exceptions based on rehabilitative concerns.  Reitz, 
supra note 1, at 1487. 
26. As stated in the draft report on pending revisions to the Model Penal Code,  
Even when a decisionmaker is acquainted with the circumstances of a particular 
crime, and has a rich understanding of the offender, it is seldom possible, 
outside of extreme cases, for the decisionmaker to say that the deserved penalty 
is precisely x. . . .  Instead, most people‘s moral sensibilities, concerning most 
crimes, will orient them toward a range of permissible sanctions that are ―not 
undeserved.‖  Outside the parameters of the range, some punishments will 
appear clearly excessive to do justice, and some will appear clearly too 
lenient—but there will nearly always be a substantial gray area between the two 
extremes. 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. b at 5.  Professor Paul Robinson 
contends that the demands of retributive proportionality are far more precise than the ALI admits.  
Paul H. Robinson, The A.L.I.’s Proposed Distributive Principle of “Limiting Retributivism”: Does It 
Mean in Practice Anything Other than Pure Desert?, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 10 (2003).  As I have 
argued else, however, I believe that Robinson overstates the specificity of retribution.  O‘Hear, Plea 
Bargaining, supra note 16, at 440–42. 
2009] APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE EXPLANATIONS 757 
But I do mean to suggest that even the most thoughtful and well-informed 
attempt to advance purposes in a particular case is less likely to produce a 
single, discrete, best sentence than a range of roughly equally acceptable 
outcomes. 
Given this indeterminacy, a second dimension of justice also becomes 
important: uniformity.  This concept, too, is nicely expressed by the federal 
sentencing statute: ―The court, in determining the particular sentence to be 
imposed, shall consider . . . the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct.‖27  Defendants (or, for that matter, victims and the general public) 
may have a hard time evaluating whether defendants‘ sentences are just in the 
purpose-advancement sense, but will often more readily be able to see 
whether their sentences are in line with sentences given to others who are 
similarly situated.
28
  Indeed, resentment over sentence disparities has been 
recognized as a source of disciplinary problems in prisons.
29
  By contrast, 
uniformity in sentencing promotes respect for the law and greater ex ante 
predictability in punishment, which may enhance the deterrent effects of 
criminal law and the fairness and efficiency of plea bargaining.
30
 
Explanation review is capable of advancing justice in both the 
purposefulness and uniformity senses.  This may seem a counterintuitive 
claim, for I have characterized explanation review as procedural, not 
substantive, in nature; yet, I am now suggesting that explanation review may 
have salutary substantive effects.  The connection between substance and 
procedure here is established through the concept of cognitive bias.  
Psychological research demonstrates that certain common human tendencies 
often distort the exercise of judgment by causing decision makers to give too 
much weight to some considerations and not enough to others.
31
 
Of particular concern for present purposes are cognitive biases that cause 
earlier received information to receive greater weight than later received 
information, even though the ordering of the information may have little to do 
with its actual relevance.  For instance, there is the anchoring effect: a large 
 
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006).  The uniformity objective has also been embraced in the 
ABA‘s STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 23, § 18-2.5(b), at 31, and in the tentative 
draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2)(b)(ii), at 1–2. 
28. O‘Hear, Plea Bargaining, supra note 16, at 437–40, 442. 
29. Michael M. O‘Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 749, 760, 773 (2006) [hereinafter O‘Hear, Original Intent]. 
30. See id. at 769–70; Michael M. O‘Hear, Is Restorative Justice Compatible with Sentencing 
Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 305, 309, 312–13, 319–20 (2005). 
31. For an overview of some of the literature on cognitive bias, see Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477–78, 1518–19, 1523–24, 
app. at 1548–50 (1998). 
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body of research indicates that ―the articulation of a number—even an 
arbitrarily selected number—at the start of a decision-making process may 
play an important role in shaping the final outcome.‖32  Thus, in sentencing, 
the initial articulation of a possible sentence length (say, in the form of a 
recommendation by an advisory guideline, a prosecutor, or a presentence 
investigation report) may cause that number to exert an important 
gravitational pull on the ultimate sentencing decision, even though it may not 
necessarily reflect adequate consideration of the full range of purposes of 
sentencing, the case-specific facts relevant to those purposes, or the sentences 
imposed on similarly situated defendants in other cases. 
A similar source of bias is the phenomenon of belief perseverance: as 
people process new information, they generate theories about its meaning and 
significance; information received later then tends to be assimilated to the 
theory or discarded.
33
  Consider how belief perseverance might play out in 
sentencing.  The first information a judge receives about a case is apt to relate 
to the unjustified harm that the defendant has caused or threatened to cause; 
this will be the focus of the charging instrument, as well as the presentation of 
evidence at trial or (more frequently) the determination of whether there is a 
factual basis for the defendant‘s guilty plea.  In the face of such information, 
the judge is apt to form a theory that the offense was a severe one and the 
defendant is a dangerous person.
34
  Mitigating information (e.g., the 
defendant‘s difficult upbringing and economic circumstances, cognitive 
limitations, mental illness, family responsibilities, prior good works, and post-
offense rehabilitative efforts) will typically have to wait for the sentencing 
process itself.  Assimilated to an earlier formed theory of depravity, however, 
this information is easily discounted: for instance, the presentation of 
 
32. Michael M. O‘Hear, The Duty to Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 
After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 627, 645 (2006); see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining 
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2515–19 (2004) (describing the anchoring 
effect).  To be sure, it is important to realize that the strength of this and other forms of cognitive bias 
may vary considerably among different individuals and in different situations, and the results of 
laboratory studies (typically involving undergraduate students) should not be uncritically ascribed to 
highly educated decision makers operating in professional settings.  Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and 
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal 
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72–73 (2002).  Studies of judges, however, do indicate that judicial 
decisions are hardly immune from anchoring effects and other forms of bias.  Chris Guthrie et al., 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19–29 (2007). 
33. Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative 
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 608–14 (2002). 
34. Bail determinations may provide an early opportunity for a defendant or his lawyer to 
present more positive information, but these are often cursory affairs, Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do 
Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail , 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1726–27 (2002), and may be overseen by a magistrate or a judge other than 
the one who will impose sentence. 
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difficulties in life may be seen as an attempt to shift responsibility for the 
offense to others; cognitive limitations and mental illness may be seen as 
support for the view that the defendant is a dangerously unstable person with 
poor prospects for rehabilitation; and post-offense rehabilitative efforts may 
be seen as insincere and self-serving.  The information might be processed 
quite differently—perhaps in a more effective, purpose-advancing way—if 
simply presented in a different order. 
Cognitive science thus provides reasons to doubt whether judges are fully 
taking into account all of the information that is available to them that is 
relevant to the determination of a purposeful, uniform sentence.  Indeed, there 
are a number of other forms of cognitive bias that may also diminish the 
quality of sentencing outcomes, such as racial bias
35
 and bias induced by 
highly emotional victim impact testimony.
36
  Of course, to note tendencies 
toward cognitive bias is not to say that such biases routinely infect sentences.  
And one hopes that judges self-consciously seek to avoid bias and attend fully 
to all relevant information, and that defense lawyers, presentence 
investigation report authors, and even prosecutors take it upon themselves to 
highlight important information that might otherwise get lost in the cognitive 
shuffle.  But, of course, judges, defense lawyers, probation officers, and 
prosecutors are often spread thin and may have little appreciation of the 
cognitive pitfalls.  Given these realities, process requirements enforced by the 
appellate courts may make a helpful contribution. 
More specifically, psychological research suggests that requiring people to 
explain the basis for their decisions tends to mitigate cognitive biases and lead 
to better consideration of the full range of available information.
37
  This 
phenomenon may result in part from the fact that explaining decisions 
increases accountability,
38
 which can ―attenuate biases that arise from lack of 
self-critical attention to one‘s decision processes and failure to use all relevant 
 
35. See BRENDA R. MAYRACK, WIS. SENT‘G COMM‘N, RACE & SENTENCING IN WISCONSIN: 
SENTENCE AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS FIVE CRIMINAL OFFENSE AREAS 3 (2007) 
(discussing research indicating that criminal justice actors perceive blacks to be ―uniquely 
threatening‖ and linking ―Afrocentric facial features‖ with longer sentences, even holding offense 
severity and criminal history constant); Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: 
Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 106 (2006) (―[A]n 
emerging body of research on implicit bias suggests that racial stereotypes shape perceptions of the 
seriousness or dangerousness of particular situations and social problems . . . .‖). 
36. Bryan Myers et al., Psychology Weighs in on the Debate Surrounding Victim Impact 
Statements and Capital Sentencing: Are Emotional Jurors Really Irrational?, 19 FED. SENT‘G REP. 
13, 14–17 (2006). 
37. Guthrie et al., supra note 32, at 36–38 (discussing how explanation requirements often 
induce deliberation and reduce intuitive or impressionistic reactions that may be biased); Mitchell, 
supra note 32, at 134–35 (noting how explanation requirements may reduce certain gain/loss framing 
effects in choice). 
38. Mitchell, supra note 32, at 135. 
760 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:751 
cues.‖39  There are also benefits that may arise from requiring explanations to 
respond to the major arguments made by the parties: studies indicate that 
―directing experimental subjects to consider alternative or opposing 
arguments, positions, or evidence has been found to ameliorate the adverse 
effects of several biases, including the primacy or anchoring effect [and the] 
biased assimilation of new evidence.‖40 
Such research suggests that appellate review of sentence explanations 
could help to ensure that the underlying decisions reflect more careful 
consideration of all of the available information bearing on purposefulness 
and uniformity.  Again, Part V will suggest more specific legal principles to 
achieve these substantive justice goals. 
C.  Transparency and Information-Sharing Benefits 
A thorough sentence explanation creates a permanent record of what the 
judge found to be important about the case and why.  This information may be 
valuable in a number of respects.  For instance, in a jurisdiction with 
substantive appellate review of sentences, a good record of the sentencing 
judge‘s views of the case may assist the appellate court by drawing its 
attention to what another judicial officer thought to be the most salient offense 
and offender characteristics.
41
 
More generally, good explanations become a conduit by which the 
particular insights and experiences of trial court judges can pass to sentencing 
policy makers.  Trial court judges occupy a unique position in the criminal 
justice system.  Their perspective is more like that of a prosecutor or public 
defender than that of an appellate judge—inasmuch as they see many more 
criminal cases than appellate judges, and in much richer detail—but they do 
not have the limitations that come with the advocate‘s role.  A trial court 
judge‘s position may thus provide important insights into such matters as the 
relative severity of different types of offenses, the effects of incarceration on 
defendants and defendants‘ families, the significance of apology, the structure 
of criminal organizations, and the exercise of discretion by police and 
prosecutors—all matters bearing on the selection of a just sentence.  For these 
reasons, the framers of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) system 
 
39. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 265 (1999). 
40. Mitchell, supra note 32, at 133. 
41. Although the constitutionality of substantive review is questionable, see supra note 11, it 
remains a feature of sentencing practice in some jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (―Assuming that the district court‘s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the 
appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed . . . .‖); 
IND. R. APP. P. 7(B) (―The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 
consideration of the trial court‘s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of 
the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.‖). 
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recognized from the start the benefits of a robust feedback loop from the 
judiciary to the Sentencing Commission for the purpose of improving the 
Guidelines over time.
42
  There seems no reason that state sentencing 
commissions, where they exist, could not also benefit from such a feedback 
loop.
43
  Legislatures might also benefit from a rich record of trial court 
perspectives on sentencing.
44
  So, too, would new judges whose own views of 
sentencing are not yet fully developed. 
Finally, prosecutors and defense lawyers could also benefit from a richer 
record of judicial sentencing wisdom, if only to help them better tailor their 
presentations to the particular interests of individual judges.  To be sure, there 
is much folk wisdom among practitioners about what different judges look for 
at sentencing, but folk wisdom is not infallible—think of that childhood game 
―telephone‖—and new or infrequent criminal law practitioners may not have 
ready access to the folk wisdom. 
D.  Summary 
The case for explanation review thus rests on a vision of the sentencing 
process as respectful, purposeful, uniform, and transparent.  Nor is this vision 
an idiosyncratic one; as I have argued elsewhere, this vision animated the 
national sentencing reform movement that gathered steam in the 1970s and 
culminated in the adoption of the federal Guidelines in the 1980s.
45
  As will 
be shown in the next Part, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has also embraced 
this vision in its explanation review cases.
46
  Although explanation review 
 
42. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 cmt. ed. note (2006) (reprinting 
introductory note to original 1987 edition of the Guidelines Manual, at § 1A4(b): ―By mon itoring 
when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so, the 
Commission, over time, will be able to create more accurate guidelines . . . .‖). 
43. Indeed, the ALI has embraced this ideal in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6A.05(5), at 102. 
44. Ideally, policy makers would gain access to sentencing explanations through an agency, 
such as a sentencing commission, that would systematically collect and synthesize them.  Even in the 
absence of such an agency, however, the feedback loop could still function through media coverage 
of high-profile sentencings and the publication of written sentencing opinions in case reporters.  
45. O‘Hear, Original Intent, supra note 29, at 752. 
46. Similar ideals lie behind the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra 
note 13, § 1.02(2)(a), 1.02(2)(b)(ii), 1.02(2)(b)(viii), at 1–2 (embracing purpose-advancing sentencing, 
uniformity, and transparency as general purposes of sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code).  
Not surprisingly, in justifying the requirement that departures from presumptive guidelines be 
explained, the tentative draft offers a similar set of reasons to those I have given for a more general 
explanation requirement.  First, ―[m]any flaws in reasoning, or insights otherwise hidden, come to 
light only through the effort of explanation.‖  Id. § 7.XX cmt. e at 277.  ―Second, the requirement 
serves the goal of communication of each judge‘s reasoning process to other judges, and others in the 
sentencing system.‖  Id. at 278.  Third, the requirement facilitates appellate review of departure 
decisions.  Id.  ―Finally, the requirement of a statement of reasons is intended to enhance the 
legitimacy of the sentencing process in the eyes of the offender, the victim, and the public.‖  Id. at 279. 
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cannot guarantee that sentencing will always live up to the reformist vision, 
there are good reasons to think that rigorously enforced explanation standards 
can make a significant contribution to its realization. 
III.  THE WISCONSIN EXPLANATION REQUIREMENT 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first clearly embraced a sentencing 
explanation requirement in its 1971 decision in McCleary v. State.
47
  
McCleary, however, proved to have little practical effect.
48
  Thirty-three years 
later, the court attempted to reinvigorate the explanation requirement in State 
v. Gallion.
49
  Again, however, there is little evidence of any significant, 
sustained practical effects.
50
  In this Part, I will identify weaknesses in the 
McCleary and Gallion opinions that have diminished the quality of 
explanation review in Wisconsin.  Much of the difficulty in Wisconsin stems 
from the appellate courts‘ failure to insist on the use of objective benchmarks 
in explaining sentences.  This failure was vividly confirmed by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court‘s 2007 decision in State v. Grady,51 in which the court 
affirmed that Wisconsin‘s advisory sentencing guidelines need not play any 
meaningful role in the determination and explanation of sentences.  After 
assessing McCleary and Gallion, this Part thus concludes with a discussion of 
Grady. 
A.  McCleary 
In some respects, McCleary was a visionary opinion, one that drew as 
much on the national sentencing reform movement as it did on Wisconsin 
precedent.  In so doing, McCleary hitched Wisconsin‘s sentencing 
jurisprudence to some of the major objectives that drove the development of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines system, including the ideals of respectful, 
purposeful, and transparent sentencing.  Yet, the ambitious purposes endorsed 
by McCleary were undermined by doctrinal vagueness and hesitancy at key 
points. 
In McCleary, the sentencing judge imposed an indeterminate prison term 
of up to nine years on a check forger with no prior criminal history.
52
  He 
cited the defendant‘s lack of remorse as a reason for not ordering probation, 
but, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court put it, the judge ―made no attempt to 
explain why the near-maximum sentence was appropriate in the 
 
47. 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). 
48. See infra note 70. 
49. 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
50. See infra note 98. 
51. 2007 WI 81, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364. 
52. 49 Wis. 2d at 269–70, 182 N.W.2d at 516. 
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circumstances.‖53  Because of the lack of explanation, the supreme court 
concluded that the sentencing judge had abused his discretion.
54
  The supreme 
court then reduced McCleary‘s sentence to an indeterminate term of up to five 
years.
55
  In settling upon this number, the court relied on the fact that five 
years was the maximum McCleary could have gotten under three sets of 
model sentencing guidelines prepared by national law reform organizations.
56
 
Although McCleary plainly endorsed explanation review by the 
Wisconsin courts, the premise on which the case was decided—that the 
sentencing judge ―gave no reason‖ for the sentence57—meant that the supreme 
court did not have to provide a fine-grained analysis of what it would take for 
an explanation to pass muster.  But, through its lengthy reasoning and dicta, 
the McCleary court sent a variety of signals, not entirely consistent with one 
another, as to what it hoped to accomplish. 
On the one hand, McCleary adopted an ambitious set of objectives for 
appellate sentencing review—objectives that were expressly borrowed from 
the national sentencing reform movement.  Quoting the ABA‘s Approved 
Standards on Appellate Review of Sentences, the court specifically endorsed 
the following objectives: 
―(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, 
having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the 
offender, and the protection of the public interest; 
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording 
him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have 
regarding his sentence; 
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the 
sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the 
sentencing process; and 
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for 
sentencing which are both rational and just.‖58 
The first and fourth of these objectives fit broadly under my heading of 
―purpose-advancing‖ sentencing, the second and third relate to the purposes 
of procedural justice, and the fourth embodies an aspect of the informational 
 
53. Id. at 270, 182 N.W.2d at 516. 
54. Id. at 282, 182 N.W.2d at 522. 
55. Id. at 291, 182 N.W.2d at 526. 
56. Id. at 289, 182 N.W.2d at 525–26.  The model guidelines were those contained in the 
Model Sentencing Act, prepared by the Advisory Council of Judges of the National Council on 
Crime and Delinquency; the Model Penal Code, prepared by the ALI; and the Standards Relating to 
Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, prepared by the ABA.  Id., 182 N.W.2d at 525. 
57. Id. at 284, 182 N.W.2d at 523 (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at 274–75, 182 N.W.2d at 518 (quoting STANDARDS ON APP. REVIEW OF SENTENCES 
§ 1.2, at 7 (1968)). 
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benefits of explanation review.
59
 
Despite such high aspirations, various aspects of the opinion made it 
unlikely that McCleary would actually have much sustained impact.  For one 
thing, McCleary seemed to demand very little by way of explanation: 
[A]ll an appellate court can ask of a trial judge is that he state 
the facts on which he predicates his judgment, and that he 
give the reasons for his conclusion.  If the facts are fairly 
inferable from the record, and the reasons indicate the 
consideration of legally relevant factors, the sentence should 
ordinarily be affirmed.
60
 
There is certainly no suggestion here that an explanation need be 
responsive to the parties‘ arguments, that the judge must discuss relevant 
benchmarks, or that sentences must be expressly related to any of the 
overarching purposes of punishment.  Short of overt racism or another 
obviously impermissible form of discrimination, it is not clear how any 
explanation that referenced at least a few case-specific facts would actually 
fail the McCleary test. 
McCleary‘s force was further diluted by the opinion‘s affirmation of a 
―‗strong policy against interference with the discretion of the trial court in 
passing sentence.‘‖61  Also in this vein, the court indicated that the appellate 
standard of review for sentences was the same deferential ―abuse of 
discretion‖ standard used in some civil contexts.62  Although the deference 
was not so limitless as to save McCleary‘s own sentence, the court‘s analysis 
of the facts particularly emphasized aspects of the sentencing judge‘s conduct 
 
59. In discussing these objectives, the McCleary court drew on reasoning that particularly 
emphasized the contributions an explanation requirement would make to the goals of purposefulness, 
uniformity, and information-sharing: 
―[T]he requirement that the sentencing judge articulate the basis for his sentence 
will assist him in developing for himself a set of consistent principles on which 
to base his sentences . . . . 
. . . .  
. . .  Since determining what sentence to impose has nearly always been a 
matter of judicial discretion, few opinions have been written to explain 
sentences.  The knowledge and wisdom of individual judges have thus died with 
them.  Sentence review at least holds out the hope that the knowledge and 
wisdom of our experts will not die with them.  It also holds out the hope that our 
system will be fairer and more equitable for that reason.‖ 
Id. at 280, 182 N.W.2d at 521 (quoting STANDARDS RELATING TO APP. REVIEW OF SENTENCES 
§ 1.2(d) cmt. at 29 (Approved Draft 1968) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
60. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 281, 182 N.W.2d at 521. 
61. Id. at 276, 182 N.W.2d at 519 (quoting State v. Tuttle, 21 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 124 N.W.2d 9, 
11 (1963)). 
62. McCleary, 49 Wis. 2d at 277, 182 N.W.2d at 519–20. 
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that were unusual or easily avoided in future cases, to wit, the failure to offer 
any explanation for a sentence just below the statutory maximum of ten years 
and the reliance on a presentence investigation report prepared by ―a new and 
inexperienced caseworker, who had, according to the record, no prior 
experience or training in probation work.‖63 
Perhaps the greatest good that McCleary could have accomplished would 
have been if lower courts had regarded as a model the supreme court‘s own 
explanation for McCleary‘s modified five-year sentence, which was 
thoughtfully based on available benchmarks.  One benchmark the court used 
was the statutory range: 
Since it is the role of the courts to find rationality in 
legislative enactments where possible, we must conclude that 
the legislature intended that maximum sentences were to be 
reserved for a more aggravated breach of the statutes, and 
probation or lighter sentences were to be used in cases where 
the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the criminal 
did not require a maximum or near-maximum sentence.  The 
legislature intended that individual criminals, though guilty of 
the same statutory offense, were not necessarily to be treated 
the same but were to be sentenced according to the needs of 
the particular case as determined by the criminals‘ degree of 
culpability and upon the mode of rehabilitation that appears 
to be of greatest efficacy.
64
 
Taking these considerations into account, the court concluded that a 
sentence near the top-of-the-range benchmark was not warranted: 
Our review of the record . . . convinces us that this is a run-
of-the-mine forgery case, less aggravated than many.  None 
of the facts set forth in the presentence report or the entire 
record justifies a ten-year sentence.  There is nothing in the 
record to show any tendency toward violence or a tendency to 
persist in criminal conduct.
65
 
Interestingly, this conclusion that the case was ―run-of-the-mine‖ was 
reached just two paragraphs after the opinion‘s author, Justice Heffernan, 
referenced his own fifteen years of experience as a prosecutor,
66
 thereby 
implicitly suggesting a second sort of benchmark, that being the sentencing 
judge‘s own prior cases. 
 
63. Id. at 283, 182 N.W.2d at 522. 
64. Id. at 275, 182 N.W.2d at 519. 
65. Id. at 286, 182 N.W.2d at 524. 
66. Id. at 285, 182 N.W.2d at 523. 
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Another set of benchmarks, as noted above, was supplied by the model 
sentencing guidelines developed by national organizations, all of which would 
have established a five-year maximum for McCleary.
67
  The court treated this 
five-year level as the maximum sentence within the range of reasonableness, 
and then actually imposed the five years in deference to the trial judge‘s 
apparent desire to err on the side of a longer sentence for McCleary.
68
 
In all of this (save, of course, for the final step of deferring to the lower 
court), the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided a thoughtful model for how a 
sentencing judge might combine case-specific factors, overarching purposes 
of sentencing, and objective benchmarks in arriving at an appropriately 
explained sentence.  But, importantly, all of this analysis took place in the 
context of arriving at a modified sentence for McCleary after it was already 
decided that his sentence had not been adequately explained, not in the 
context of delineating mandatory features of the explanation requirement.  
Given the tendency of lawyers and judges to focus on what is truly required, it 
should be no surprise that McCleary had far less impact than the reformers of 
the early 1970s might have hoped. 
B.  Gallion 
Thirty-three years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly sought to 
reinvigorate McCleary in Gallion.  After quoting McCleary‘s admonition that 
―‗requisite to a prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial judge 
detailing his reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed,‘‖69 the 
Gallion court observed: 
Those words are as true today as they were when they 
first appeared in McCleary.  Yet, sentencing courts have 
strayed from the directive.  Instead, for some, merely uttering 
the facts, invoking sentencing factors, and pronouncing a 
sentence is deemed sufficient.  Such an approach confuses the 
exercise of discretion with decision-making.
70
 
 
67. Id. at 289–90, 182 N.W.2d at 525–26. 
68. Id. at 290–91, 182 N.W.2d at 526. 
69. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 1, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 (quoting McCleary, 
49 Wis. 2d at 281, 182 N.W.2d at 521).  
70. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 2.  The court also quoted with approval similar criticisms from the 
intermediate court of appeals: 
―[T]he collective memory of the panel members assigned to this appeal could 
not produce any ready examples of cases since [McCleary] in which an 
appellate court overturned a sentence determination, absent the use of an 
improper factor or other illegality . . . .  
There appears to be some truth to the appellant‘s contention that a trial court 
that articulates the magic words ‗seriousness of the offense,‘ ‗character of the 
offender‘ and ‗need to protect the public‘ will avoid any meaningful review of 
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After more than three decades of ―mechanical‖ compliance with 
McCleary,
71
 why did the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempt to reinvigorate 
the McCleary explanation requirement in Gallion?  The answer, at least in 
part, seems to lie in the recent abolition of parole in Wisconsin.  In the view of 
the Gallion court, the switch from indeterminate to determinate sentencing 
rendered McCleary‘s mandates more urgent than ever because parole boards 
no longer ―served as a check on sentencing courts‘ exercise of discretion.‖72 
The more immediate cause of Gallion, though, was a fatal car collision 
that resulted from an intoxicated driver running a red light.
73
  The driver, 
Gallion, pled guilty to homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle and was 
sentenced to prison for twenty-one years.
74
  On appeal to the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, Gallion challenged his sentence on several grounds, including 
the adequacy of the explanation provided by the sentencing judge.
75
 
Before addressing the specifics of Gallion‘s arguments, the supreme court 
first offered a lengthy, general discussion of the McCleary explanation 
requirement.  Indeed, the court offered considerably more guidance, including 
somewhat more exacting legal standards, than did McCleary itself.  Recall 
that McCleary demanded ―facts‖ and ―reasons,‖ but suggested that the reasons 
would be deemed adequate as long as they did not indicate the consideration 
of legally improper factors.  By contrast, in its desire to end ―mechanical 
sentencing,‖ the Gallion court required a more thorough explanation, 
including the following components: 
[Sentencing] courts are required to specify the objectives of 
the sentence on the record.  These objectives include, but are 
not limited to, the protection of the community, punishment 
of the defendant, rehabilitation of the defendant, and 
deterrence to others. 
Courts are to identify the general objectives of greatest 
importance.  These may vary from case to case. . . . 
 
the sentence it imposes. 
Id., ¶ 27 (quoting State v. Crouthers, No. 99-1307-CR, 2000 WL 336730, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 
30, 2000)).  For an unusual example of a pre-Gallion decision by the court of appeals that overturned 
a sentence on McCleary grounds, see State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108, ¶¶ 19–21, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 
648 N.W.2d 41.  The same case also includes a concurring opinion that rebuked the trial court judge 
in unusually direct terms for repeated failures to provide adequate explanations of sentences and 
other rulings.  Id., ¶¶ 22–40 (Schudson, J., concurring). 
71. See Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 26 (criticizing the ―mechanical form of sentencing‖ that 
resulted from the ―disconnect‖ between McCleary‘s ―principles as-stated and its principles as-
applied‖). 
72. Id., ¶ 33. 
73. Id., ¶ 10. 
74. Id., ¶¶ 11, 13. 
75. Id. ¶ 14. 
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Courts are to describe the facts relevant to these 
objectives.  Courts must explain, in light of the facts of the 
case, why the particular component parts of the sentence 
imposed advance the specified objectives.
76
 
The vision is one of purpose-advancing sentencing: ―In short, we require 
that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the 
sentence‘s component parts promote the sentencing objectives.‖77  The 
Gallion court, moreover, insisted that the ―linkage‖ between facts and 
purposes, on the one hand, and the sentence imposed, on the other, be stated 
on the record.
78
  The court observed, ―Allowing implied reasoning rather than 
requiring an on-the-record explanation for the particular sentence imposed lies 
at the heart of [McCleary‘s] erosion.‖79 
When I teach Gallion in my Sentencing class, I invoke the ―underpants 
gnomes‖ from the television series South Park.80  As they explain to the child-
protagonists of South Park, the underpants gnomes have a three-step plan: (1) 
collect underpants, (2) [awkward silence], (3) profits.  The plan is laughable, 
of course, because it is missing the most important and difficult part: the 
transformation of underpants into profits.  The gnomes have an input 
(underpants) and a desired output (profits), but no idea how to connect them.  
Gallion, I think, is really criticizing Wisconsin sentencing courts for being 
underpants gnomes: they recite an input (case-specific facts and generic 
purposes of sentencing) and an output (the particular sentence imposed) 
without explaining how the input relates to the output.  Something else 
besides facts and purposes must be stated before a sentence of, say, twenty-
one years in prison can truly be said to have been explained. 
How might the requisite linkage be established?  In answering this 
question, the Gallion court had both a crucial insight and, perhaps, a failure of 
nerve.  The insight relates to the use of benchmarks: ―Because we recognize 
the difficulty in providing a reasoned explanation in isolation, we encourage 
[sentencing] courts to refer to information provided by others.‖81  Note, 
though, how the court shifted from the mandatory language used elsewhere in 
the opinion to language of ―encourage[ment]‖—this is what strikes me as a 
failure of nerve.  In elaborating on this point, the court continued to use 
 
76. Id., ¶¶ 40–42 (citation omitted). 
77. Id., ¶ 46. 
78. Id. 
79. Id., ¶ 50. 
80. A video clip of the exchange, titled ―The Underpants Business,‖ can be viewed at 
http://www.southparkstudios.com/clips/151040.  The entire episode, South Park: Gnomes (Comedy 
Central television broadcast Dec. 16, 1998), can be viewed at http://www.southparkstudios.com/ 
episodes/103595/.  
81. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 47. 
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discretionary language: ―Courts may . . . consider information about the 
distribution of sentences in cases similar to the case before it.‖82  The court 
also noted the availability of advisory sentencing guidelines prepared for 
some offenses by the Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee.
83
 
The court‘s failure to more forcefully insist on the consultation of 
benchmarks seriously undermined its effort to reinvigorate the McCleary 
explanation requirement, for it is not clear otherwise how a persuasive linkage 
may be articulated between sentencing inputs and outputs.  As discussed 
above, the science and philosophy of sentencing are not adequately developed 
to generate some precise sentencing output given some particular set of 
offense and offender characteristics.
84
  In the absence of a precise and reliable 
analytical process intrinsic to the recognized purposes of sentencing, it is hard 
to have confidence that any given sentence was arrived at in an objective, 
non-arbitrary fashion without some reference to benchmarks extrinsic to the 
purposes themselves.
85
 
The Gallion court‘s most helpful gesture in this direction was to establish 
something of a rebuttable presumption in favor of probation.  Gallion 
indicated that sentencing courts ―should consider probation as the first 
alternative.  Probation should be the disposition unless: confinement is 
necessary to protect the public, the offender needs correctional treatment 
available only in confinement, or it would unduly depreciate the seriousness 
of the offense.‖86  Probation thus became a generic benchmark for all cases.  
But this benchmark is of little value in the many cases in which probation is 
not on the table as a serious option, and the sentencing judge‘s real task is to 
select a substantial term of incarceration within a wide range (as in the 
Gallion case itself, where the judge could have selected any sentence up to 
forty years of confinement
87
). 
Two possible explanations for the court‘s failure of nerve come to mind.  
First, the court may have been concerned about the limited availability of 
 
82. Id. (emphasis added). 
83. Id. 
84. See supra notes 24–26. 
85. The American Law Institute makes a similar point in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENTENCING: 
An inescapable difficulty, in any sentencing policy that incorporates moral 
intuitions or constraints, is that people of good faith often disagree about what 
justice demands in particular cases.  Systemwide benchmarks for the 
determination of proportionate sanctions provide a useful starting point for 
reasoned case-specific analysis in the criminal courtrooms. 
See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 1.02(2) cmt. c at 10. 
86. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 44. 
87. Id., ¶ 74. 
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statewide benchmarks: the sentencing guidelines cover only eleven offenses,
88
 
while good statewide data on actual sentencing practices are hard to come by.  
But a variety of solutions to the problem are available.  State guidelines might 
be consulted for the many offenses that are analogous to the eleven expressly 
covered.
89
  Guidelines prepared by national organizations or agencies might 
be consulted, as the McCleary court itself had done.  Likewise, guidelines 
from other states might also be consulted, such as the nationally well-regarded 
guidelines of Wisconsin‘s neighbor to the west, Minnesota.90  The Wisconsin 
statutory maximum might also be employed as a benchmark, as McCleary had 
done.  Additionally, as implicitly suggested by McCleary, a sentencing judge 
might reference her own prior cases,
91
 as well as similar cases sentenced in 
the same county or reported in the published case law or in the media. 
To be sure, all of these benchmarks are flawed in one way or another.  But 
that does not mean they are totally unhelpful, particularly when multiple 
benchmarks all point roughly in the same direction.  Recall, for instance, that 
all three model sentencing guidelines consulted by the McCleary court 
pointed to a maximum sentence of five years, which helped to convince the 
court that five years was at the top of the range of reasonability for 
McCleary‘s offense. 
A second possible explanation for the court‘s failure of nerve lies in the 
court‘s desire to avoid overly formulaic, numbers-driven sentencing.  As the 
Gallion court itself noted, ―Individualized sentencing . . . has long been a 
cornerstone to Wisconsin‘s [sentencing] jurisprudence.  [N]o two convicted 
felons stand before the sentencing court on identical footing . . . and no two 
cases will present identical factors.‖92  Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
was undoubtedly aware that the federal sentencing system, which had long 
been criticized for being too formulaic, had been specifically considered and 
rejected as a model for Wisconsin in the late 1990s.
93
  Yet, the Gallion court 
could have more firmly embraced the use of objective benchmarks without 
transforming Wisconsin sentencing into anything closely resembling the 
disfavored federal system.  More specifically, the court‘s mandate could have 
 
88. Thomas J. Hammer, The Long and Arduous Journey to Truth-in-Sentencing in Wisconsin, 
15 FED. SENT‘G REP. 15, 16–17 (2002). 
89. The tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING also recommends such 
consultation of analogous guidelines for offenses not covered by the guidelines.  See MODEL PENAL 
CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 7.XX cmt. i at 283. 
90. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 23, at xxi–xxv (noting use of the 
Minnesota system as the model for the sentencing provisions of the ABA‘s Standards for Criminal 
Justice). 
91. Supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
92. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 48 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
93. Hammer, supra note 88, at 16. 
2009] APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE EXPLANATIONS 771 
been framed, not in terms of conformity to any particular benchmark, but in 
terms of consultation of a range of benchmarks, with freedom on the part of 
the sentencing judge to reject any or all proposed benchmarks so long as some 
reason was given for the rejection. 
Whatever the explanation for the court‘s failure of nerve, its effect became 
apparent in the second half of the Gallion opinion, in which the court shifted 
its attention from general principles to a specific consideration of the 
defendant‘s contentions.  Where McCleary offered a model of thoughtfully 
explained sentencing, Gallion was guilty of the same shallow analysis for 
which it rightly criticized the state‘s lower courts. 
The defendant‘s central contention was that his sentence was inadequately 
explained: 
[H]e contends that re-sentencing is required in light of the 
[sentencing] court‘s failure to describe the comparative 
weight given to the factors it identified, or to explain why the 
sentence constitutes the minimum amount of necessary 
confinement.  Gallion complains, ―almost any number of 
years in prison could be plugged in [the sentence imposed].‖  
He further asserts that, ―the court never stated how much 
incarceration was needed to accomplish 
rehabilitation/protection, or how, or why, 21 years of 
incarceration was needed . . . .‖94 
He complained, in short, that the sentencing judge in his case had been an 
underpants gnome. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed.  In reviewing the 
sentencing transcript, the court cataloged the sentencing judge‘s citation of 
purposes and case-specific facts.  For instance, the supreme court observed, 
[T]he circuit court took into account the need to protect the 
public from Gallion and others like him.  It determined that 
the defendant could best accomplish his rehabilitation in an 
institutional setting.  The court also observed that society has 
an interest in punishing Gallion so that his sentence might 
serve as a general deterrence against drunk driving.
95
 
The sentencing judge made similar case-specific findings with respect to 
retributive purposes.
96
  But none of this is truly responsive to Gallion‘s 
contention that the same purposes and facts might have been cited in support 
of almost any sentence length.  It is not at all obvious why the rehabilitative, 
 
94. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 53. 
95. Id., ¶ 61. 
96. See id., ¶ 59 (discussing ―gravity of the offense‖). 
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incapacitative, deterrent, and retributive purposes that were on the sentencing 
judge‘s mind could not have been equally well, or even better, served by a 
sentence of five years or forty years. 
The explanation for Gallion‘s sentence would have been far more 
analytically satisfying—would have been more truly an ―explanation‖—had 
relevant benchmarks been invoked.  Imagine, for instance, if the sentencing 
judge had said, in addition to his other conclusions regarding facts and 
purposes, something to the effect of: 
Gallion was convicted of a Class B felony.  His criminal 
history, addiction, poor education and employment record, 
and failure to take advantage of earlier treatment 
opportunities justify his classification as a high-risk offender 
under the classification system used in the Wisconsin 
sentencing guidelines.  The two available sentencing 
guidelines for other Class B felonies indicate a range of five 
to forty years and ten to forty years, respectively, for high-
risk offenders.  To be sure, these guidelines relate to different 
offenses, first-degree sexual assault and first-degree sexual 
assault of a child.  But the offenses are analogous to homicide 
by intoxicated operation of a car in that all three are very 
serious crimes against the person.  Gallion‘s crime is arguably 
more serious in that it necessarily involved a loss of life.  On 
the other hand, his crime was something of a strict liability 
offense, which arguably requires less by way of bad 
intentions than the other two crimes.  On the whole, I find the 
guidelines for the other Class B felonies to be helpful 
benchmarks in sentencing Gallion. 
Although Gallion‘s crime was a very serious one, in that 
a life was lost, we must remember that everyone who 
commits the same offense as Gallion is, by definition, 
responsible for the loss of a life.  Within the group of 
homicide by intoxicated operation cases, I find nothing highly 
aggravated or mitigated about the severity of Gallion‘s 
offense, although the fact that Gallion was so far above the 
legal blood alcohol limit makes his conduct a little bit more 
aggravated than that of others.  For a crime of midrange 
severity committed by a high-risk offender, the existing 
guidelines for Class B offenses call for a range of fifteen to 
thirty or ten to twenty-five years.  The sentence of twenty-one 
years I have selected is just slightly above the midpoint of 
those ranges.  This is appropriate for a case that is slightly 
aggravated relative to other cases in which the same offense 
was committed by a high-risk offender. 
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This proposed explanation is not beyond criticism, and it is certainly not 
the only possible way to bring benchmarks to bear, but it does provide some 
meaningful linkage between the facts of the case and the sentence imposed, as 
the first half of the Gallion opinion indicated was necessary.
97
 
In the end, it is hard to see how Gallion advanced much beyond 
McCleary.  To be sure, Gallion helped a little by stating more clearly than its 
predecessor that explanations must identify which of the general purposes of 
punishment are being served by a sentence, and which facts were found 
relevant to determining what those specified purposes require.  But the real 
criticism of pre-Gallion sentencing was not a failure to recite appropriate 
purposes and facts, but that purposes and facts were discussed in a mechanical 
way without clear linkages established to the sentence imposed.  When it 
comes to addressing this problem, Gallion missed the mark by (a) failing to 
insist more forcefully on the use of benchmarks, which can contribute a great 
deal to making the requisite analytical linkages; and (b) affirming Gallion‘s 
sentence, despite the sentencing judge‘s apparent failure to do anything more 
than recite relevant purposes and facts.
98
 
C.  Grady 
If the Wisconsin Supreme Court left any doubts about its disinterest in 
enforcing the consideration of benchmarks, those doubts were put to rest by 
its 2007 decision in State v. Grady.
99
  In contrast to Gallion, Grady dealt with 
an offense, armed robbery, for which a sentencing guideline was available.  
Ample statutory authority existed in this context to enforce the explicit 
consideration of the guideline as a benchmark.  Indeed, the relevant statutory 
language from section 973.017(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes (the sentencing 
court ―shall consider‖ an applicable guideline) uses the exact same mandatory 
language found in the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which 
(as we shall see in the next Part) has been interpreted to require express 
 
97. Id., ¶ 46. 
98. As might have been expected based on these aspects of Gallion, the decision has not had 
much discernible impact at the intermediate court of appeals level.  I find only two instances in 
which the court of appeals has overturned a sentence under Gallion based on a trial court‘s failure to 
adequately explain an initial term of confinement.  See State v. Nunez, No. 2004AP3347-CR, 2006 
WL 627164 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2006); State v. Perkins, No. 04-0302-CR, 2004 WL 1925891 
(Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004).  Both opinions are unpublished, which seemingly reflects a 
reluctance to encourage additional Gallion claims.  The impression is strengthened by the court of 
appeals‘ opinion in an early post-Gallion case, State v. Stenzel, in which Gallion was treated almost 
disdainfully.  2004 WI App 181, ¶ 9, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688 N.W.2d 20 (―While Gallion revitalizes 
sentencing jurisprudence, it does not make any momentous changes. . . .  Having been reinvigorated, 
we now turn to Stenzel‘s arguments.‖).  To be sure, a handful of additional court of appeals decisions 
overturn sentences on Gallion grounds, but these cases focus on matters other than the explanation 
originally given by a trial court for a term of confinement.  See infra note 147. 
99. 2007 WI 81, 302 Wis. 2d 80, 734 N.W.2d 364. 
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calculation and discussion of the guideline range.
100
  Yet, the Grady court 
interpreted the ―shall consider‖ mandate in such a feeble way that the 
consultation of benchmarks in guidelines cases need be no more meaningful 
than their consultation in non-guidelines cases. 
The procedural history of Grady helps to make this point plain.  After 
being convicted, Grady was sentenced to a twenty-year term of 
confinement.
101
  During the hearing, no reference was made to the applicable 
sentencing guideline, and it appears that no guideline worksheet was actually 
filled out for Grady.
102
  When the defendant filed a postconviction motion 
objecting to the judge‘s neglect of the guidelines, the judge denied the motion 
with a conclusory assertion that ―the court considered the sentencing 
guidelines without explicitly identifying that fact and it is clearly apparent 
from the record that the court did so.‖103 
In response to Grady‘s appeal of the ruling, the supreme court made 
several decisions that served to undermine the effect of the statutory ―shall 
consider‖ language.  First, the court flatly rejected Grady‘s contention ―that a 
judge must complete any applicable sentencing guideline worksheet.‖104  The 
worksheet sets forth the factors made relevant by the guideline and, if filled 
out, creates a record that the factors were, in fact, considered.  Mandating that 
the worksheet be filled out would be in keeping with Gallion‘s requirement of 
―an on-the-record explanation‖ in lieu of ―implied reasoning.‖105  Yet, the 
Grady court rejected such a mandate with little more than a conclusory 
invocation of the need to preserve ―the exercise of discretion that is 
fundamental to sentencing,‖106 by which the court seems to have had in mind 
the freedom to ―decid[e] the weight to be given to particular factors.‖107  Here, 
the court seemed to conflate substance and procedure: to require sentencing 
judges to perform the procedure of filling out a guideline worksheet is not in 
derogation of their authority to decide how much substantive weight to give to 
the factors set forth in the worksheet.  Although sentencing judges have also 
traditionally enjoyed some discretion with respect to sentencing procedure, an 
essential premise of both McCleary and Gallion is that this procedural 
 
100. Two years after Grady, the Wisconsin legislature repealed the relevant language.  2009 
Wis. Legis. Serv. 1021 (West). 
101. 2007 WI 81, ¶ 9. 
102. Id., ¶ 10. 
103. Id., ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104. Id., ¶ 38.  Copies of the full set of advisory guidelines worksheets are available at 
Wisconsin Sentencing Commission: Guidelines, http://wsc.wi.gov/section.asp?linkid=4&locid=10 
(last visited June 21, 2010).  Extensive excerpts are also available at Hammer, supra note 88, at 19–31. 
105. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶¶ 49–50, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
106. 2007 WI 81, ¶ 38. 
107. Id., ¶ 31. 
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discretion is not absolute, but must give way before the mandate of an 
adequate explanation.  And the Grady court simply did not answer the question 
of why the explanation requirement requires the recitation of case-specific facts 
and objectives (per Gallion) but not the filling in of a two-page worksheet. 
Second, the court rejected Grady‘s contention that the ―shall consider‖ 
language requires that the guideline sentencing range be considered.
108
  The 
court suggested that sentencing judges could discharge their obligation to 
consider the guideline by considering any of the five sections of the guideline 
worksheet, of which the chart setting forth the range was only one.  But this 
seems a rather unnatural reading of what it means to ―consider‖ the guideline, 
particularly when one appreciates that the range is the centerpiece of the 
guideline: the whole point of three sections of the worksheet is to help the 
judge determine what the range is, the fourth sets forth potential grounds for 
adjustment of the range, and the fifth is merely for recording the sentence 
imposed.  The court also invoked separate statutory language indicating that 
judges need not impose a sentence within the range.
109
  However, this once 
again conflates substance and procedure: the judge might consider the range 
(procedure) without selecting a sentence within the range (substance). 
Finally, the court rejected Grady‘s contention that the sentencing judge 
was required to ―explain both how the sentencing guideline fits the objectives 
of sentencing and how the sentencing guideline influences the sentence.‖110  
The court distinguished between considering a guideline (which is statutorily 
required) and explaining how the guideline influenced the sentencing calculus 
(which is not).  On the other hand, the court might have reasonably read into 
the consideration requirement an implicit requirement that the consideration 
be put on the record, which would be the functional equivalent of the 
explanation Grady was seeking.  Such an interpretation would mirror the 
court‘s earlier maneuver in McCleary of divining from the principle that 
sentencing is an act of discretion the procedural requirement that the sentence 
be explained so that appellate courts can ensure that discretion was, in fact, 
exercised.
111
  By analogy, a consideration requirement implies that the 
consideration must be stated on the record so that an appellate court may 
ensure that the statutory duty was satisfied.  Moreover, quite apart from the 
statutory duties, McCleary and Gallion provide an alternative basis for 
requiring an explanation of the role played by the guidelines.  As Gallion put 
it, ―[c]ourts must also identify the factors that were considered in arriving at 
the sentence and indicate how those factors fit the objectives and influence the 
 
108. Id., ¶ 39. 
109. Id., ¶ 41 (citing WIS. STAT. § 973.017(10m) (2003–2004)). 
110. Id., ¶ 42. 
111. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1971). 
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decision.‖112  It appears that Grady may not have made the McCleary–Gallion 
argument,
113
 but the court‘s failure even to mention McCleary or Gallion in 
connection with a defendant‘s claim that his sentence was not adequately 
explained does not bode well for the court‘s present commitment to the two 
cases or the explanation requirement they elaborated.
114
 
IV.  THE FEDERAL EXPLANATION REQUIREMENT 
A decade ago, the Wisconsin and federal systems looked dramatically 
different: While Wisconsin retained a traditional indeterminate, discretionary, 
guidelines-less approach to sentencing, the federal system had abandoned 
parole and adopted binding guidelines, which were vigorously enforced by the 
intermediate courts of appeals.
115
  The ensuing years, however, have 
witnessed considerable, though by no means complete, convergence between 
the systems.  On the Wisconsin side, as noted in the previous Part, parole was 
replaced with determinate sentencing, advisory guidelines were adopted for 
eleven common offenses, and Gallion invited more searching appellate review 
of sentences.  On the federal side, meanwhile, the United States Supreme 
Court‘s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker changed the federal 
Guidelines from mandatory to advisory and loosened appellate scrutiny of 
sentences.
116
  Indeed, in both systems, the role of the guidelines is now 
controlled by identical statutory language: the judge ―shall consider‖ the 
 
112. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 43, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
113. See 2007 WI 81, ¶ 42 (―Grady does not argue that the court failed to satisfy its 
§ 973.017(10m) obligation to state the reasons for its sentencing decision.  His sole complaint relates 
to the sentencing court‘s failure to consider the applicable sentencing guideline.‖). 
114. Post-Grady decisions in the court of appeals demonstrate how marginalized the guidelines 
have become.  See, e.g., State v. Porter, No. 2008AP343-CR, 2009 WL 260958, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Feb. 5, 2009) (―[W]e would affirm if the court simply stated, in any words, that its sentencing 
decision did include consideration of the applicable sentencing guideline.‖).  The case law was 
divided, though, on the question of how to conduct harmless error analysis when the sentencing 
judge did not even make the minimal statement required by Grady that the guideline was considered.  
Compare id. at *2 (―[W]e cannot accept the State‘s argument that considering the same factors [as 
those set forth in the applicable guideline worksheet] renders the failure to consider a guideline 
harmless.‖) with State v. Davy, No. 2007AP851-CR, 2008 WL 2597574, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. July 2, 
2008) (―The court‘s approach to sentencing echoed the sentencing guidelines worksheet . . . .  
Therefore, the court‘s failure to refer to the guidelines at sentencing was harmless.‖).  For reasons 
outlined below in Part V.A.11, I do not believe that harmless error analysis is appropriate in this 
context.  
  
The harmless error issue is apparently mooted going forward in Wisconsin by the legislature‘s 
recent decision to repeal § 973.017(2)(a), 2009 Wis. Legis. Serv. 1021 (West), but the issue remains 
important for other jurisdictions that still require the consideration of sentencing guidelines. 
115. Reitz, supra note 1, at 1466. 
116. 543 U.S. 220, 245, 264–65 (2005). 
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guidelines when determining the sentence.
117
 
Despite the increased similarity between the systems relative to a decade 
ago, post-Booker federal case law has ensured that significant differences 
remain.  Booker itself was perhaps the high point of convergence, with Grady 
and the United States Supreme Court‘s 2007 decision in Rita v. United 
States
118
 marking a new trend toward divergence.  Rita, which drained the 
federal explanation requirement of much of its force, will be the main focus of 
this Part. 
In light of Grady and Rita, while both the Wisconsin and federal systems 
are advisory guidelines systems, they present starkly contrasting ways that an 
advisory system can be implemented, and both approaches are flawed in their 
own distinct ways.  As to the explanation requirement specifically, 
Wisconsin‘s vice is a failure to insist that explanations refer to available 
objective benchmarks.  This failure has likely had adverse consequences from 
the standpoint of both uniformity (if sentencing judges were required 
expressly to address objective benchmarks, they would be at least marginally 
more likely to adhere to them,
119
 which might reduce the incidence of outlier 
sentences) and perceived neutrality (if judges referenced objective 
benchmarks as influential on their sentencing decisions, they would reassure 
defendants that the sentences were not merely capricious or based on 
improper considerations). 
The contrasting vice of the federal system is to place too much emphasis 
on the calculation of just one objective benchmark, the Guidelines sentence, 
to the detriment of both other, arguably more salient benchmarks and critical, 
purpose-driven evaluation of the appropriateness of the Guidelines sentence.  
The chief adverse effects here are in the areas of purpose-advancement 
(required to provide little by way of explanation beyond the Guidelines 
calculation, the sentencing judge may avoid much intellectual engagement 
with the overarching purposes of sentencing) and consideration (the 
sentencing judge can largely disregard defendants‘ arguments for below-
Guidelines sentences). 
Rita deserves much of the blame.  Before considering what Rita had to say 
regarding explanation review, though, it will be helpful to review some of the 
basic contours of post-Booker federal sentencing: 
 The sentencing decision is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which 
requires the judge to ―consider‖ a number of factors, including the 
 
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2006); Wis. Stat. § 973.017(2)(a) (2007–2008). 
118. 551 U.S. 338 (2007). 
119. See O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 474–75. 
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traditionally recognized purposes of sentencing
120
 and the recommended 
Guidelines range.
121
 
 Post-Booker cases indicate that ―a district court should begin all 
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines 
range . . . .  [T]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial 
benchmark.‖122 
 ―[A]fter giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence 
they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the 
§ 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by 
a party.  In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines range is 
reasonable.‖123 
 ―After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the judge] must adequately 
explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to 
promote the perception of fair sentencing.‖124 
 ―If [the judge] decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, 
he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is 
sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. . . .  [A] major 
departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor 
one.‖125 
 Other than the Guidelines range, the other section 3553(a) factors need not 
necessarily be given an ―explicit, articulated analysis‖ in all cases.126 
 ―[T]he appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-
discretion standard.  It must first ensure that the district court committed no 
significant procedural error . . . .  Assuming that the district court‘s sentencing 
decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the 
substantive reasonableness of the sentence . . . .‖127 
 ―If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, 
but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.  But if the 
sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a 
 
120. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). 
122. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
123. Id. at 49–50. 
124. Id. at 50. 
125. Id. 
126. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant‘s 
argument that such analysis was required); see also United States v. Shan Wei Yu, 484 F.3d 979, 988 
(8th Cir. 2007) (―It is not necessary for the district court to ‗provide a mechanical recitation of the 
§ 3553(a) factors‘ so long as it is ‗clear from the record‘ that the court considered them.‖) (citation 
omitted); United States v. Cruz, 461 F.3d 752, 754 (6th Cir. 2006) (―[C]onsideration [of the 
§ 3553(a) factors] need not be evidenced explicitly in some mechanical form.‖) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
127. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 
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presumption of unreasonableness.‖128 
Before Rita, several circuits adopted an additional explanation 
requirement: if imposing a Guidelines sentence, the judge was required 
specifically to address nonfrivolous arguments made by the defendant for a 
sentence below the Guidelines range.
129
  Although Rita did not categorically 
reject such a responsiveness requirement, the Court‘s analysis seemingly left 
little room for it to be rigorously enforced. 
Rita was convicted of perjury and related offenses, producing a Guidelines 
range of thirty-three to forty-one months.
130
  Rita then sought a downward 
variance based on three factors: (1) as a result of his career in law 
enforcement, he faced a risk of retribution from other inmates while in prison; 
(2) he was a decorated veteran of the Armed Forces; and (3) he suffered from 
a variety of medical conditions.
131
  After Rita presented evidence and 
argument relating to these factors, the judge nonetheless chose to impose the 
Guidelines sentence.
132
  He offered only a brief explanation of his decision: 
The court was ―‗unable to find that the [presentence investigation report‘s 
recommended] sentencing guideline range . . . is an inappropriate guideline 
range for that, and under 3553 . . . the public needs to be protected.‘‖133  The 
judge concluded, ―‗[I]t is appropriate to enter‘ a sentence at the bottom of the 
Guidelines range.‖134 
When his case reached the Supreme Court, Rita presented a number of 
issues for review, but the only one of immediate interest was his argument 
that the sentencing judge did not adequately explain why Rita‘s arguments for 
a below-range sentence were rejected.  And the Court did indeed recognize a 
need for appellate courts to ensure that the sentencing process was a reasoned 
one.
135
  At the same time, the Court made clear that judges were not required 
to express their reasons, but might instead rely on context and inference to 
supply implicit reasoning: 
[W]e cannot read the statute (or our precedent) as insisting 
upon a full opinion in every case.  The appropriateness of 
 
128. Id. (citation omitted). 
129. See United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1116–18 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 
(6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). 
130. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 344 (2007). 
131. Id. at 344–45. 
132. Id. at 345. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. See id. at 356 (―In the present context, a statement of reasons is important.  The sentencing 
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties‘ 
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.‖). 
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brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what 
to say, depends upon circumstances.  Sometimes a judicial 
opinion responds to every argument; sometimes it does not; 
sometimes a judge simply writes the word ―granted‖ or 
―denied‖ on the face of a motion while relying upon context 
and the parties’ prior arguments to make the reasons clear.  
The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge‘s own 
professional judgment. 
. . .  [W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the 
Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily 
require lengthy explanation.  Circumstances may well make 
clear that the judge rests his decision upon the [Sentencing] 
Commission‘s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is 
a proper sentence . . . in the typical case, and that the judge 
has found that the case before him is typical.
136
 
Even as to cases in which a colorable argument was advanced for a 
variance, the Court hedged its language to avoid implying a duty to address 
the argument expressly: ―Where the defendant or prosecutor presents 
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence, . . . the judge will 
normally . . . explain why he has rejected those arguments.‖137  Here, the 
Court seemed merely to describe what is usually done, avoiding the use of 
such words as ―shall‖ or ―must‖ that would connote some sense of obligation. 
Thus, while the judge in Rita may not have done what other judges 
normally do, the lack of explanation did not violate any legal duty: 
We acknowledge that the judge might have said more.  
He might have added explicitly that he had heard and 
considered the evidence and argument; that . . . he thought the 
Commission in the Guidelines had determined a sentence that 
was proper in the mine run of roughly similar perjury cases; 
and that he found that Rita‘s personal circumstances here 
were simply not different enough to warrant a different 
sentence.  But context and the record make clear that this, or 
similar, reasoning underlies the judge‘s conclusion.138 
Instead of accepting such implicit reasoning, a better rule would require 
an express judicial response to nonfrivolous arguments for a below-
Guidelines sentence.  Such a rule would obviously advance procedural justice 
objectives
139
 and achieve information-sharing benefits.  The rule would also 
 
136. Id. at 356–57 (emphasis added). 
137. Id. at 357 (emphasis added). 
138. Id. at 359. 
139. I say ―obviously‖ because of the clear connection between responsiveness and the 
consideration dimension of procedural justice.  There may also be other, more subtle procedural 
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further the goal of purpose-advancing sentencing: focusing greater attention 
on arguments for below-range sentences would help judges better appreciate 
when the Guidelines range is excessive relative to the purposes of § 3553(a).  
This might happen when the Guidelines fail to take into account some 
unusual, but important, feature of a particular case.  Or it might happen when 
a governing guideline has been poorly designed and fails to effectively 
advance the purposes of sentencing even in routine cases.  This is likely true, 
for instance, of the crack cocaine Guideline, which even the Sentencing 
Commission has concluded ―fails to meet the sentencing objectives set forth 
by Congress in . . . the Sentencing Reform Act.‖140  Moreover, although the 
crack cocaine Guideline has been a particular target of criticism for many 
years, other Guidelines may be similarly flawed.
141
  In any event, if judges are 
required to attend more carefully to purpose-driven arguments, they are less 
likely simply to impose an unjustifiable Guidelines sentence because it is the 
path of least resistance.
142
 
Although Rita undercut the responsiveness component of the federal 
 
justice benefits.  Consider neutrality.  Although adherence to the Guidelines might initially seem a 
reliable way to reassure defendants of objectivity in the sentencing decision, the Guidelines‘ 
orientation to easily quantified sentencing factors masks a number of potentially arbitrary exercises 
of discretion.  For instance, if a defendant is prosecuted in federal court for committing a crime that 
is more routinely prosecuted in state court, the defendant may have a colorable argument that it 
would be arbitrary not to take state law into account in setting his sentence.  Likewise, if a defendant 
could show that most other federal defendants convicted of the same crime, either on a national or a 
district-specific basis, received sentences below his Guidelines level, then the defendant might have a 
colorable argument that the actual practice-based norms should be taken into account as an 
alternative benchmark.  To reject such colorable arguments without principled explanation is to leave 
the defendant with the sense that he has been singled out for unusually harsh treatment and hence to 
engender perceptions of non-neutrality.  Finally, requiring responsiveness also promotes feelings of 
respect in another sense: showing the defendant that a Guidelines sentence has not simply been 
reflexively imposed reassures the defendant that his Sixth Amendment rights have not been violated 
by a de facto mandatory Guidelines system.  O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 481–83. 
140. U.S. SENT‘G COMM‘N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY 91 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf. 
141. See, e.g., Ian N. Friedman & Kristina W. Supler, Child Pornography Sentencing: The 
Road Here and the Road Ahead, 21 FED. SENT‘G REP. 83, 83–86 (2008) (discussing flaws in child 
pornography sentencing Guidelines); Michael M. O‘Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT‘G 
REP. 249, 251–53 (2005) (summarizing various design flaws found throughout the guidelines) 
[hereinafter O‘Hear, Myth]; Michael M. O‘Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, 
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 217–30 (2004) 
(providing critique of environmental sentencing Guidelines). 
142. Imposing the Guidelines sentence has become the path of least resistance because of the 
interplay of Rita and Gall.  Gall requires the sentencing judge first to calculate the Guidelines sentence, 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007), and then justify any deviation from the Guidelines 
sentence, id. at 49–50.  Rita, by contrast, permits the sentencing judge to impose the Guidelines sentence 
with little or no additional justification.  551 U.S. 338, 356–57 (2007).  Additionally, the appellate 
presumption of reasonableness recognized in most circuits and approved by the Supreme Court, Gall, 552 
U.S. at 50, ensures that the risks of reversal are very low as long as the Guidelines sentence is imposed. 
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explanation requirement, it does retain some life in some circuits post-Rita.
143
  
On the other hand, some of the intermediate federal courts of appeals have 
also imposed other limitations on the responsiveness rule that go beyond what 
Rita itself seemed to contemplate,
144
 such as a requirement that defendants 
specifically object to explanation problems in the district court or face 
deferential plain-error review on appeal.
145
  As I have argued elsewhere, such 
limitations operate as a trap for the unwary and inappropriately limit the 
usefulness of explanation review.
146
 
V.  PROPOSED RULES FOR EXPLANATION REVIEW 
In this Part, I first propose a set of rules to guide explanation review by 
appellate courts in a system without mandatory sentencing guidelines.  Next, I 
address various criticisms that might be made of the proposal. 
A.  The Rules 
The following proposed rules attempt to meld together the most attractive 
features of explanation review in the Wisconsin and federal systems, with a 
particular eye to correcting what I perceive to be the major failings of Gallion, 
Grady, and Rita.  I have addressed what seem to be the leading issues that 
have emerged from the explanation case law, but there are no doubt other 
issues that might arise that have escaped my attention.
147
  Thus, I offer the 
 
143. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 470 n.72, 472 n.79; see also United 
States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 2009) (vacat ing sentence based on inadequate 
explanation).  As I have observed elsewhere, Harris presents a potentially useful way of 
distinguishing Rita and reinvigorating explanation review, at least in cases in which the sentence is a 
very long one and the defendant was not sentenced at the bottom of the range.  Michael M. O‘Hear, 
Seventh Circuit Case of the Week: Sentencing Judges, You‘ve Got Some ‘Splaining to Do, 
http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2009/06/06/seventh-circuit-case-of-the-week-sentencing-
judges-youve-got-some-splaining-to-do/ (June 6, 2009). 
144. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 470–71.   
145. See, e.g., United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United 
States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007). 
146. O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 471.   
147. I focus here on explanations given for sentences of imprisonment.  As the post-Gallion 
Wisconsin case law reveals, however, sentence explanation requirements can be extended beyond the 
specific context presented by Gallion.  See State v. Cherry, 2008 WI App 80, ¶ 11, 312 Wis. 2d 203, 
752 N.W.2d 393 (―Because the record does not reflect a process of reasoning before the trial court 
imposed the $250 DNA surcharge, we reverse that portion of the judgment and order.‖); State v. 
Ramel, 2007 WI App 271, ¶ 14, 306 Wis. 2d 654, 743 N.W.2d 502 (―[W]e do conclude that under 
Gallion some explanation of why the court imposes a fine is required.‖); In re Richard J.D., 2006 WI 
App 242, ¶¶ 11–12, 14, 297 Wis. 2d 20, 724 N.W.2d 665 (applying Gallion explanation requirement 
to juvenile dispositional orders); State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217, ¶ 23, 277 Wis. 2d 400, 690 
N.W.2d 452 (indicating that Gallion explanation requirement extends to reconfinement orders 
following revocation of extended supervision); State v. Nelson, Nos. 2005AP713-CR, 2005AP714-
CR, 2006 WL 44079 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2006) (applying Gallion explanation requirement to 
resentencing).  Whatever the merits of these decisions, I believe that explanation review of sentences 
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following list as a nonexhaustive starting point. 
1.  A Sentence That Has Not Been Adequately Explained Constitutes an 
Abuse of Discretion and Is Subject to Reversal on That Ground 
This principle was advanced by McCleary and Gallion, and is consistent 
with the post-Booker federal law.
148
  (Of course, Wisconsin and federal law 
differ when it comes to defining what constitutes an adequate explanation.)  
Providing defendants with a potential remedy on appeal helps to ensure that 
lower courts comply with explanation norms. 
2.  The Sentencing Court Must Specify the Principal Purpose or Purposes of 
the Sentence 
This principle is derived from Gallion.
149
  Consistent with the ideal of 
purposeful sentencing, judges should be required to frame their sentence 
explanations by reference to overarching objectives of sentencing.  Focusing 
attention on purposes in this way should help to ensure that sentences can 
indeed be justified as purpose-advancing.
150
  For present purposes, I do not 
mean to advocate for one particular purpose or set of purposes, but rather take 
as a given that the potential purposes have been specified elsewhere (in the 
federal system, for example, at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)).  Assuming that the 
jurisdiction has endorsed more than one potential purpose, the overriding 
purpose(s) may vary according to the needs of the case, as Gallion 
indicated.
151
 
This principle deviates from the federal system, where, under Rita, 
sentencing judges need do little more than calculate the Guidelines sentence 
in most cases.
152
  Thus, the intermediate federal appellate courts have rejected 
arguments that sentencing judges must explain all sentences by reference to 
the § 3553(a)(2) factors.
153
  The federal approach to explanation review, 
which emphasizes guidelines over express analysis of purposes, is especially 
problematic because the federal Guidelines are not grounded in the traditional 
purposes of sentencing.
154
  A jurisdiction with more explicitly purpose-
advancing guidelines might appropriately place less emphasis on case-by-case 
judicial analysis of purposes.
155
 
 
of imprisonment should be the highest priority.  See infra Part V.B.1. 
148. See supra note 142. 
149. See State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 40, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. 
150. This principle may also advance the neutrality goal inasmuch as the purposes of 
sentencing constitute facially neutral (albeit largely indeterminate) bases for the sentence. 
151. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 41. 
152. See O‘Hear, Explaining Sentences, supra note 14, at 469. 
153. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 728–29 (7th Cir. 2005).  
154. O‘Hear, Original Intent, supra note 29, at 780. 
155. The ALI, for instance, embraces such a model of explicitly purpose-advancing guidelines 
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3.  In Explaining How a Purpose Is Advanced by a Particular Sentence, the 
Court Must Identify the Case-Specific Facts on Which It Relies and Indicate 
How They Relate to the Purpose 
This principle, too, is derived from Gallion.
156
  Judges should not simply 
offer a rote recitation of purposes, but ought to devote real thought to how the 
relevant purposes play out in the case at hand.  The judge may not simply say, 
―I am sentencing you to ten years in prison to protect the community from 
being victimized by you again,‖ but should also add, for instance, ―Your three 
prior felony convictions and the fact that you committed the present crime 
while on parole indicate to me that you are likely to reoffend if released again 
any time soon.‖  A detailed explanation, in this sense, helps to ensure that 
sentences truly are purpose-driven and to reassure defendants that they are not 
being sentenced on the basis of caprice or improper considerations.  The fact-
based explanation can also help appellate courts to determine if there has been 
clearly erroneous fact-finding and to conduct substantive review.  Finally, the 
analysis of how to implement purposes of punishment can educate policy 
makers and others regarding trial-court perspectives on criminal justice. 
4.  For Prison Sentences, the Explanation Should Make Clear Both Why a 
Sentence of Probation Was Rejected and Why a Materially Shorter Term of 
Confinement Would Not Have Adequately Accomplished the Relevant 
Purposes of Sentencing 
Gallion clearly endorsed the first part of this principle, that is, explaining 
why probation was rejected,
157
 but was less clear about the latter.  On the one 
hand, the court stated, ―[I]f a [sentencing] court imposes jail or prison, it shall 
explain why the duration of incarceration should be expected to advance the 
objectives it has specified.‖158  On the other hand, the court also 
acknowledged, 
We are mindful that the exercise of discretion does not 
lend itself to mathematical precision.  The exercise of 
discretion, by its very nature, is not amenable to such a task.  
As a result, we do not expect [sentencing] courts to explain, 
for instance, the difference between sentences of 15 and 17 
years.
159
 
Moreover, the fact that the court did not respond effectively to Gallion‘s 
own argument that ―almost any number of years of prison could be plugged 
 
in the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 6B.03 cmt. a at 179. 
156. 2004 WI 42, ¶ 42. 
157. Id., ¶¶ 21, 25, 44. 
158. Id., ¶ 45 (emphasis added). 
159. Id., ¶ 49. 
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in‖160 also tends to undermine the extent to which Gallion can be read to 
require explanation for material, incremental increases in sentence length.  
Yet, it should go without saying that, for defendants, there is a profound 
difference between, for instance, five years and twenty-five years in prison.  
Such differences should be explained no less than the decision to sentence the 
defendant to prison in the first place. 
The real difficulty with this principle is how to identify the line of 
materiality.  I would agree with the Gallion court, for instance, that the 
difference between fifteen and seventeen years is not so great as to warrant 
specific explanation.  As a somewhat arbitrary, but reasonably workable, 
dividing line, I would suggest a rule of thirds: the judge should be required to 
explain why a sentence one-third less than the sentence imposed was not 
adequate in light of the relevant purposes of sentencing.  Thus, for instance, 
the judge in Gallion would not have been required to explain why a sentence 
of twenty-one years was imposed instead of eighteen, but would have been 
required to justify twenty-one over fourteen. 
5.  If There Is an Applicable Advisory Sentencing Guideline, the Court Must 
Determine What Range Is Recommended by the Guideline, Unless the Court 
Expressly Finds that the Benefits of Calculating the Guideline Range Do Not 
Warrant the Costs 
On the whole, this principle is meant to endorse the federal over the 
Wisconsin approach to advisory guidelines.
161
  I have already noted the 
neutrality and uniformity benefits of using objective benchmarks in 
sentencing,
162
 and a guideline range, where one is available, seems an 
obviously important benchmark to consult.  On the other hand, calculating a 
range may sometimes require a judge to resolve complex legal or factual 
disputes.  If the judge has some other benchmark in mind that is clearly more 
salient (for instance, if the circumstances of the case are so aggravated that the 
judge is committed to imposing a sentence at or near the top of the statutory 
range regardless of what the guideline recommends), then the judge might 
appropriately decide not to bother with the complex guideline questions.  
Likewise, if a guideline question appears to be a close one, but will not have a 
large effect on the ultimate guideline recommendation, the judge might 
simply split the difference without unduly undermining the goal of principled 
sentencing based on objective benchmarks.
163
 
 
160. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
161. For advisory guidelines systems, the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
also requires that sentencing judges ―consult the sentencing guidelines carefully and accurately.‖  See 
MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 13, § 7.XX cmt. i at 284. 
162. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
163. Even the federal courts have recognized that it may not be necessary to resolve all 
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6.  If the Sentence Is Outside an Applicable Advisory Guideline Range, the 
Court Must Explain Why the Sentence Chosen Is Believed to Advance the 
Relevant Purposes of Sentencing Better than the Guideline Sentence 
Like the previous principle, this one more closely follows the federal 
approach than Wisconsin‘s, although it is not intended to embrace all of the 
limitations on non-Guidelines sentences that have appeared in the post-Booker 
jurisprudence.
164
  As long as the sentencing judge offers a reason that is 
rationally related to one or more of the purposes of sentencing, that reason 
should suffice.  The reason might rest on something unusual in the case not 
taken into account in the guideline, on a principled policy disagreement with 
the drafters of the guideline, or on a justifiable conclusion that some other 
objective benchmark must also be taken into account.  To demand much more 
than this would be to move nominally advisory guidelines far down the path 
toward mandatory, which (among other potential difficulties) might raise 
significant Sixth Amendment issues.  But to fail to demand any explanation 
for a non-guideline sentence (as Wisconsin does) seems to sacrifice the 
neutrality and uniformity values embodied in a guideline system without 
much countervailing benefit.  It also undermines the feedback loop that might 
lead to better guidelines.
165
 
7.  If the Sentence Is Within the Applicable Advisory Guideline Range, the 
Court Must Expressly Address Any Nonfrivolous Arguments Made by the 
Defendant for a Sentence Below the Range and Explain Why the Arguments 
Were Rejected 
This principle represents a rejection of Rita, and instead adopts the 
approach suggested by the Seventh Circuit in the pre-Rita case United States 
v. Cunningham.
166
  The principle is intended to address the concerns that Rita 
may lead in some cases to the mechanical imposition of an unjustifiably harsh 
 
Guidelines issues now that the Guidelines are advisory.  See, e.g., United States v. Sanner, 565 F.3d 
400, 405–06 (7th Cir. 2009). 
164. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (―[A] major departure should be 
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.‖).  Additionally, it remains unclear how 
much authority federal district court judges have to impose a sentence outside the applicable range 
because of a policy disagreement with the Guidelines.  Although the Supreme Court authorized such 
variances in the crack cocaine context in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02, 111 
(2007), some lower courts have suggested that the authority is essentially limited to crack cases, see, 
e.g., United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (―Kimbrough dealt only 
with certain Guidelines—those that, like the crack cocaine Guidelines, ‗do not exemplify the 
Commission‘s exercise of its characteristic institutional role.‘‖) (quoting Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109). 
165. For similar reasons, the tentative draft of MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING also requires 
an explanation for departures even from advisory guidelines—indeed, the tentative draft goes further 
by requiring that the explanations be in writing.  See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, supra note 
13, § 7.XX cmt. i at 284–86. 
166. 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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guideline sentence, or at least to perceptions of such a reflexive approach. 
8.  The Court Must Specifically Identify What Benchmark or Benchmarks 
Were Used in Setting the Sentence and Why They Were Believed to Be 
Relevant 
I assume here that the overarching purposes of sentencing are sufficiently 
indeterminate that a specific sentence cannot rationally be selected without 
reference, conscious or unconscious, to a benchmark of some sort, even if it is 
only the judge‘s recollection of sentences that she has previously imposed in 
similar cases.  Consistent with the goal of reassuring defendants that 
sentencing occurs in a neutral fashion, the benchmarks used should be 
expressly identified.  Appropriate benchmarks might include the 
recommended range from an applicable or analogous sentencing guideline 
(potentially including guidelines from other jurisdictions or national 
organizations, as were consulted in McCleary
167
), the statutory sentencing 
range (in the sense that unusually mitigated cases should be sentenced near 
the bottom of the range, unusually aggravated cases near the top, and typical 
cases somewhere in between), data on actual sentencing practices (which 
might be considered at a local, state, or national level
168
), sentences imposed 
on codefendants, and sentences imposed on the same defendant in earlier 
cases. 
Other benchmarks of potential value include the recommendations of 
probation officers and lawyers.  Practice varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction as to whether presentence investigation reports are routinely 
prepared by probation officers, and, when they are prepared, whether they 
include sentencing recommendations.  Where available, a recommendation by 
a thoughtful, experienced probation officer may constitute a neutral 
 
167. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 289–90, 182 N.W.2d 512, 525–26 (1971). 
168. In many jurisdictions, it is difficult to find reliable state and local data, which might lead 
by default to consultation of national data collected by the federal government.  Data on sentences in 
federal court are available in easily searchable form at the web site of the Bureau of Justice Statistics‘ 
Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, http://fjsrc.urban.org/ (last visited June 22, 2010).  Federal 
data on sentencing in state courts is less detailed, but still potentially useful as a benchmark.  The 
data are summarized in regular reports issued by the United States Department of Justice‘s  Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, which can be downloaded from Crime & Justice Electronic Data Spreadsheets: 
Corrections, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dtdata.cfm#corrections (last visited June 22, 2010).   
For reasons that I have suggested elsewhere, it is preferable to rely on local sentencing law and 
practice—even in federal court—for crimes that are essentially local in character, which would 
include most routine street crime.  Michael M. O‘Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: 
Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal–State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 721, 753–63 (2002).  By focusing attention on the use of benchmarks in sentencing, explanation 
review in the appellate courts might spur the collection of good, local sentencing data by the courts, 
prosecutors‘ offices, or public defender agencies.  In the absence of such data, national data may still 
be of some benchmarking value. 
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benchmark that is capable of advancing purposefulness and uniformity 
values.
169
 
Likewise, practice varies with respect to recommendations by prosecutors 
and defense lawyers.  Their recommendations, of course, do not carry the 
presumptive neutrality of a probation officer‘s.  Procedural justice concerns 
should thus make judges wary about giving much weight to prosecutor 
recommendations, particularly when they deviate substantially from those of 
defense counsel.  Even when the prosecutor and defense counsel agree, judges 
might appropriately decide not to go along with the deal, for the deal may 
reflect what is convenient for the lawyers more than what best advances the 
interests of purposeful, uniform sentencing.  On the other hand, experienced, 
thoughtful lawyers may have much to contribute to the fashioning of a 
substantively just sentence.  For that reason, lawyer recommendations should 
not be rejected out of hand as an appropriate benchmark. 
9.  If the Defendant Offers a Benchmark that the Court Rejects, the Court 
Must Explain Why the Benchmark Was Determined Not to Be Appropriate 
This principle parallels the earlier requirement that arguments for a below-
guidelines sentence should be expressly addressed. 
10.  If the Defendant Makes Any Nonfrivolous Arguments for Lenience, the 
Court Must Identify Which Arguments Were Found to Have Merit, What 
Role Those Arguments Played in the Selection of the Sentence, and Why the 
Remaining Arguments (If Any) Were Found Not to Have Merit 
This principle, like the previous one, requires responsiveness to 
defendants‘ arguments.  It is added as something of a catchall, recognizing 
that some arguments for lenience may not be framed as requests for a below-
guidelines sentence or as proposals for a particular benchmark. 
11.  Explanation Challenges Should Not Be Subject to Harmless Error 
Analysis on Appeal 
If the only purpose of explanation review were to ensure substantively 
good sentences, then it might make sense to employ harmless error analysis, 
that is, to affirm poorly explained sentences if the factors neglected in the 
 
169. For an example of a case that reversed a sentence in part for the failure of the sentencing 
judge to explain why he imposed a sentence that far exceeded the recommendation of the probation 
officer, see State v. Hall, 2002 WI App 108, ¶¶ 15–17, 255 Wis. 2d 662, 648 N.W.2d 41.  Without 
discussing Hall, the Wisconsin Supreme Court apparently limited its reach in State v. Taylor, 2006 
WI 22, ¶¶ 29–30, 289 Wis. 2d 34, 710 N.W.2d 466, in which the court affirmed the sentence despite 
the fact that the trial court ―did not explicitly state why, in its discretion, it added six more years of 
initial confinement onto the [presentence investigation report] recommendation.‖ On the other hand, 
Taylor was limited on its own terms to pre-Gallion law, id., ¶ 17 n.9, leaving open the possibility that 
a similar case would be decided differently today.  
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explanation were unlikely to influence the outcome.  (I say ―might,‖ because, 
even just with a view to the substantive quality of the sentence, harmless error 
analysis may give too much room for the cognitive biases discussed above to 
operate at the appellate level, too
170—that is, the sentence imposed below may 
unduly condition the appellate court‘s evaluation of what constitutes a just 
sentence.)  But the purposes of explanation review also encompass procedural 
justice and information sharing.  In light of those purposes, something is lost 
with a poorly explained sentence even if there is no good reason to think the 
outcome would have been altered by the unaddressed considerations.  To send 
a clear message to sentencing judges about the importance of good 
explanations, poorly explained sentences should be vacated and remanded for 
resentencing without regard to harmless error.
171
 
B.  Addressing Potential Objections 
1.  Excessive Transaction Costs 
Robust explanation requirements make the courts do more work.  As with 
any incremental process requirement, it is fair to ask whether the benefits 
warrant the additional transaction costs.  Unfortunately, such questions do not 
lend themselves to straightforward answers, because the benefits of 
incremental process (procedural justice effects, substantively higher-quality 
decisions, and enhanced transparency) are so difficult to quantify.  What can 
be done with a bit more confidence is to evaluate whether the trade-offs seem 
in line with the trade-offs we accept as to other procedural protections. 
Viewed this way, the transaction costs of mandatory explanation do not 
seem excessive.  The explanation could be delivered orally in open court at 
the same time that the sentence is imposed; there would be no routine need for 
additional proceedings.
172
  Sentencing hearings already regularly include 
statements by defendants, defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges.  To 
demand more consistently thorough remarks by judges is not likely to result in 
a large increase in the amount of time sentencing hearings take.  The sort of 
explanation contemplated by my proposed principles need not be voluminous 
or scholarly—the core of the sentencing analysis from McCleary that I have 
 
170. See supra Part II.B. 
171. As discussed above, the Wisconsin courts struggled with harmless error questions in 
connection with the former statutory requirement that sentencing judges consider the guidelines.  See 
supra note 114. 
172. There would, of course, be additional proceedings in cases in which sentences are vacated 
for inadequate explanation.  I believe there is sufficient clarity and deference in my explanation 
review principles, however, that sentencing judges should be able to satisfy them without great 
difficulty.  Thus, reversal at the appellate level will not necessarily be a common occurrence even if 
explanation standards are rigorously enforced.  Moreover, it should be remembered that reversal on 
explanation grounds only requires a resentencing; the defendant‘s conviction is not affected. 
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proposed as a model occupies about three pages of the Wisconsin Reports.
173
  
Certainly, the level of effort would be much less than federal judges must 
routinely expend on Guidelines calculations alone. 
An appropriate analogy might be to victim impact statements, which have 
become an accepted part of the sentencing process in recent years, 
notwithstanding the additional transaction costs they impose.
174
  New 
participation rights for victims at sentencing are intended to achieve similar 
procedural justice goals to those that undergird the explanation requirement.
175
  
Another good analogy would be to the standard colloquy and recitation of 
warnings in connection with guilty pleas,
176
 or to the filing of Anders briefs by 
court-appointed defense counsel in cases in which counsel does not see viable 
grounds for an appeal.
177
  As with the explanation requirement, these 
procedures involve modest incremental transaction costs that are justifiable on 
the basis of enhancing perceptions of procedural justice and establishing 
additional protections against substantively unjust outcomes. 
We should also bear in mind the importance of the liberty interests at 
stake in sentencing decisions.  Our constitutional due process jurisprudence 
properly recognizes that the need for reliable decision making is at its zenith 
when the individual interests at stake are most important.
178
  The logic of this 
jurisprudence should make us particularly hesitant to reject explanation 
review on the basis of mere transaction costs.  If need be, though, distinctions 
might be drawn based on the relative severity of the liberty deprivation.  For 
instance, explanation review might be limited to cases in which the defendant 
was sentenced to more than a year of confinement. 
2.  Pro-Defendant Bias 
I have framed my proposal as a set of principles that a defendant might 
 
173. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 288–291, 182 N.W.2d 512, 524–26 (1971). 
174. See, e.g., State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶ 64, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197 
(discussing victim rights under Wisconsin law); Wayne A. Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in 
Federal Capital Trials, 19 FED. SENT‘G REP. 5, 5 (2006) (―[Victim impact evidence] has become a 
staple in federal death penalty trials . . . .‖). 
175. See, e.g., Douglas E. Beloof, Judicial Leadership at Sentencing Under the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act: Judge Kozinski in Kenna and Judge Cassell in Degenhardt, 19 FED. SENT‘G REP. 36, 38 
(2006) (discussing victims‘ rights to allocute at sentencing in terms of respect for the dignity of the 
crime victim). 
176. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (outlining federal procedure for accepting a guilty plea 
and ensuring that it is knowing and voluntary). 
177. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
178. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 (1976) (―[T]he degree of potential 
deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the 
validity of any administrative decisionmaking process.‖); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 
(1972) (holding that loss of liberty when parole is revoked constitutes a ―grievous loss‖ that warrants 
due process protections). 
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invoke on appeal, but not the state.  Structuring explanation review this way 
reflects both a desire to limit transaction costs and the central concern I have 
with defendant perceptions of respectful treatment.  The state‘s interests in 
respectful treatment seem much less threatened by the sentencing process, as 
the state does not labor under the stigma and relative powerlessness of the 
convicted defendant.  Additionally, for reasons suggested in Part II, I suspect 
that cognitive bias dynamics are more likely to push sentences in the direction 
of greater severity than greater lenience;
179
 this asymmetry, too, might justify 
asymmetric explanation rights. 
Still, I appreciate that the state may have concerns that judges will 
systematically gravitate to more lenient sentences merely to minimize their 
explanation obligations.  Other forms of accountability (e.g., judicial 
elections), as well as judges‘ internalized sense of obligation to vindicate 
public and victim interests, may serve to allay concerns of a pro-defendant 
bias.  If not, recognizing parallel explanation rights for the state (e.g., 
requiring judges to explain themselves when they reject prosecution 
arguments for a sentence above the guidelines range) might be accomplished 
without a large increase in transaction costs.  For instance, experience with 
post-Booker sentencing appeals in the federal system shows that the 
government has been far more selective than defendants in challenging 
sentences.
180
 
3.  Too Much/Too Little Support for Guidelines 
To someone accustomed to working in the federal system, my proposal 
might be seen as providing too little weight for sentencing guidelines: I have 
deliberately rejected the aspects of the current federal system that make 
imposing the guidelines sentence the path of procedural least resistance.
181
  Of 
course, giving more weight to the guidelines might better serve uniformity 
values.  Additionally, the system might be perceived as more neutral to the 
extent it more consistently followed guidelines based on objective factors, as 
opposed to individual judges‘ determinations of which sentencing purposes to 
emphasize and how to implement them. 
To someone accustomed to working in the system of Wisconsin or a 
similar state, the reverse criticism might be made: simply by requiring that 
guidelines ranges be calculated in each case, my proposal will result in the 
guidelines having greater influence than if they could be effectively ignored 
(as permitted by Grady).  If the guidelines themselves are poorly designed to 
 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34. 
180. See U.S. SENT‘G COMM‘N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbls.56 & 
56A (2009), http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2009/SBTOC09.htm (showing 6,470 sentencing appeals 
by defendants in fiscal year 2009, and only 64 by the government). 
181. See supra note 142. 
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achieve the purposes of sentencing, then greater adherence to the guidelines 
may undermine the goal of purpose-advancing sentencing.  Moreover, having 
invested the effort to determine a guidelines range, the sentencing judge may 
be less inclined to give full consideration to defendants‘ arguments for 
lenience that are not based on guidelines factors. 
By articulating the argument from each direction, we can see there is a 
certain amount of tension among some of the values that my proposal is 
intended to advance.  With respect to procedural justice, for instance, 
neutrality values favor a system that emphasizes a limited number of objective 
factors, but such a system impedes purpose-advancing sentencing and 
provides judges with less room to give meaningful consideration to the full 
range of arguments that might be made for lenience.  A focus on uniformity 
values may lead to similar trade-offs. 
In the end, all of the competing values seem important ones, and I have 
accordingly attempted to give each some meaningful weight in the sentencing 
process, locating a space roughly halfway between the Wisconsin and federal 
systems.  The best answer, though, may vary somewhat from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction, based on, among other considerations, the quality and structure of 
the available sentencing guidelines.  A system like the federal system, with 
guidelines that are exceptionally rigid and crude,
182
 should be especially wary 
of the consideration and purposefulness costs that arise from giving too much 
weight to the guidelines.  On the other hand, a system like Wisconsin‘s, with 
much more flexible guidelines,
183
 will lose much less by giving greater weight 
to its guidelines.  Ironically, Grady might have been a good decision in the 
federal system, while Rita might have been a good decision in Wisconsin. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Many sentencing judges, perhaps the great majority, consistently offer 
thoughtful explanations for their sentences—explanations that help to reassure 
each defendant that his judge was neutral and attentive to the arguments made 
for lenience, and that the sentence imposed was intended to accomplish some 
good purpose and to avoid unwarranted disparities.  But, while this may be 
the norm, there are also plenty of sentences like the ones in McCleary and 
Rita, in which the judge‘s decision about sentence length seems reflexive and 
thoughtless.  Through rigorous explanation review, appellate courts can help 
to ensure both the appearance and the reality of better reasoned, more 
respectful sentences. 
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court discovered after McCleary, however, it 
is one thing for a high court to endorse explanation review and quite another 
 
182. See O‘Hear, Myth, supra note 141, at 250–51. 
183. See Hammer, supra note 88, at 16–17 (describing Wisconsin guidelines). 
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for such review to be conducted in a manner that actually affects sentencing 
practice.  If courts are convinced of the value of explanation review, the 
standards should be articulated more precisely and forcefully than was done in 
McCleary and Gallion.  Drawing on the most attractive features of 
explanation review in the Wisconsin and federal systems, I have suggested a 
preliminary set of eleven principles that would give more specific content to 
the explanation requirement.  Aspects of these principles are open to debate—
on the margins, I may demand too much of sentencing judges, or not quite 
enough.  But it is to be hoped that, regardless of how some of the specific 
questions are resolved, the nation‘s appellate courts will more consistently 
demand sentence explanations that befit decisions of such enormous gravity. 
